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The user concept in the space industry and how this 
frames satellite missions, with a focus on social 
development in Africa 
 
Abstract 
 
Space-derived data lies untouched in data vaults, while many potential use cases for 
space applications are not exploited by the space industry. This gap may exist because 
the conceptualisation of the user in the satellite industry is too narrow, and yet 
influences the architecture and thence outcomes of a satellite mission. Assumptions 
about users and markets are not made on the basis of data and market research, in 
itself typically difficult to obtain, especially in Africa. This results in a lack of 
understanding of the end user and their social and economic context which feeds back 
to inadequately scoped requirements in satellite design. The reasons for this are not 
solely the limited imaginations and culture of practice of satellite engineers, but the 
structure of the space industry itself and its design frameworks. This limitation has 
impact especially for developing country applications, where the user and beneficiary 
concept elide in often unexamined and unchallenged ways. The satellite industry, part 
of the wider space industry, could borrow usefully from the IT industry in its 
relationship to the user and methods of deriving user requirements; in fact could 
consider itself part of the IT/data industry. This study explores the relationship 
between satellite design and the users of space-derived data, and how this is being 
affected by new disruptors to the traditional space industry. The implications for 
potential users in Africa are considered. 
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Preface 
 
The futurist Arthur C. Clarke, quoted in the UNESCO 1968 report ‘Communications 
in the Space Age’ said: 
‘Thanks to a few tons of electronic gear twenty three thousand miles above the 
equator, ours will be the last century of the Savage; and for all mankind, the Stone 
Age will be over.’(UNESCO 1968) 
 
At that time, in the 1960s, with WWII decades behind and new technologies 
abounding, a clear line was drawn in the sand between primitive savages and a phrase 
common in my childhood: ‘Modern Man.’ This work aims to show that, although we 
have progressed technologically very much along the lines foreseen by Arthur C. 
Clarke, some aspects of our thinking remain parochial and determined by what is 
expedient. Our organisational and political structures reinforce a lack of fit between 
supply and demand. 
 
The social and political benefits provided by satellite technology which he and the 
UNESCO report predicted for developing countries have been slow to come about, 
but they are happening in spite of the entrenched structures in the space industry. 
They are happening because other industries are stepping in to provide the 
applications users want and need. 
 
‘Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately 
affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we 
regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly 
like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence1 of technology.’ (Martin 
Heidegger from his essay ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ first published in 
German in 1949). 
 
  
                                                
1 The original German word is Wesen, translated to ‘its true meaning’, but it can also mean ‘coming to 
presence’. Both uses are prevalent in his texts, and he plays with this linguistic subtlety. 
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1 
1 Introduction 
Systems engineering provides the method used to design and develop space missions. 
Methods, processes and techniques in systems engineering are designed to ensure that 
the end result of the space mission conforms to what was expected in the initial 
conception. It rests on an assumption that there is a distinction between the mission 
designers (engineers) and those who have commissioned the mission and desire its 
end results (usually a client). Construction, launch and operations will likely be 
performed by different parties, and therefore documentation and commonly 
understood processes are critical to successful alignment and outcomes of the various 
mission phases.  
 
The most influential phase of the systems engineering process is the definition of 
requirements, and entire fields of study have arisen addressing requirements, with 
their own conferences, journals and methods. This is all to ensure that there is 
agreement between the designers of the space mission, those responsible for its 
construction and eventual deployment, and those paying for it. 
 
Important in early requirements definition is a concept called ‘the user’. When 
systems engineers are designing interfaces, at some point there will be an interface to 
something called a user, or perhaps a UI (user interface). Many assumptions are 
made, consciously and unconsciously, about the user, and since user requirements 
influence many other design considerations downstream, the user concept flavours the 
entire mission. The systems engineering process, oddly, does not demand a thorough 
understanding of this user, and this is what is examined by this research.  
 
When the systems engineering method was conceived, in Bell Labs in the 1940s, the 
main customer driving the need for a more methodical approach to the design of 
complex systems was the US military. Military concerns continue to dominate space 
mission design. Now, space missions and their beneficiaries have moved out of the 
military realm, and today almost everyone in the world is reliant on, and touched by, 
space systems. This is not to say that a military approach to requirements definition is 
bad for design, only that it is worth examining whether the techniques developed by 
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and for the military work for applications very far removed from the highly 
mechanical machine-to-machine worlds of almost 80 years ago. Then, users were 
highly trained operators, not as today, where users form a much more diverse group 
of individuals. 
 
This dissertation puts forward the argument that the conceptualisation of the user in 
the satellite industry is overly narrow, and this underpins architectural design and 
thence outputs of a satellite mission. The space industry could borrow usefully from 
the IT industry, software in particular, in its methods of deriving and treating user 
requirements, in fact could consider itself part of the IT/data industry. The space 
segment is only one part of a very long chain from data to end users, and this latter 
part of the chain is largely ignored by the space industry. The ‘end user’ concept itself 
is not always present in design thinking, that being the person who actually utilises 
space-derived data for a particular end. 
 
This limitation has impact especially for developing country applications of space 
technology, where the user and beneficiary concept elide in often unexamined and 
unchallenged ways. Assumptions about markets and user behaviour are not made on 
the basis of market research, typically difficult to obtain in Africa. A lack of 
understanding of the end user markets feeds back to inadequately scoped 
requirements in satellite design, resulting in a fragmented and lengthy value chain.  
 
It is the design engineers who make untested assumptions about the user and pay this 
concept inadequate attention, and engineers who work within developing countries 
(such as the author) typically remain in their thinking within a particular social and 
political idiom, and have scant exposure to potential beneficiaries and the eventual 
end user. Clients who procure space systems are also guilty of a similar narrow focus 
in terms of how they perceive the end users (and those clients are also engineers). 
Evidence for this lies in unused and under-utilised satellite data, plus the converse, 
which is potential end user applications currently unrealised.  
 
Hard, direct evidence for these vaults of untouched satellite-derived data is difficult to 
obtain. Commercial agents and governments are understandably reluctant to divulge 
such statistics, though one can see through the operation of markets for space imagery 
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that the demand for the specific material being made available is not as widespread as 
anticipated. Geopolitics plays its part: when the US released LANDSAT data for free, 
this immediately destroyed the commercial market for similar imagery from rival 
providers.  
 
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 deals with the user concept, 
comparing its treatment in the IT and space industries. It describes a particular use 
case which scopes the problem and provides substantiating background and rationale 
for this study. The social context of the user is questioned, which is an area rarely 
discussed in engineering circles, but which has huge impact on the business model 
and delivery mechanism for space-derived data.  
 
In Chapter 3, the design methods of the satellite industry and IT industry are 
compared. This entails an exposition of systems engineering frameworks and those 
adapted and adopted within IT. Although systems engineering frameworks were 
initially ported into the IT industry, these were soon rejected or substantially 
modified, and only superficially applied in practice. The IT industry has created new 
methods, and although these borrow heavily from the original systems engineering 
frameworks, they are looser, lighter, and more cyclical in nature. IT industry 
frameworks have had to consider the end user more thoroughly in order to survive 
(although Windows users may not think so), given the fast turnaround from concept 
to market, and perceived risk-tolerant environment. 
 
The business models and value chains involved in space mission design are further 
unpacked in Chapter 4, where we consider so-called ‘disruptive’ technologies in 
space, and ask whether these are engendering an enlarged or better user concept in the 
space industry. So-called disruptive or ‘NewSpace’ borrows from the IT industry 
using lighter and faster methods of design, ignoring the usual risk-averse approaches 
in the space industry, and crushing the design-to-market cycle. If disruptive 
technologies are more responsive to market demand, does the user concept have a 
greater role to play? Some examples are examined from industry. 
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We finally investigate the developing country angle and ask what makes a space 
application suitable for developing countries and whether there is there in fact any 
distinction. This discussion explores what we may mean by a developing country 
need, and why this is important. Are there barriers to developing applications for 
developing countries? Is a financially poor user different to a wealthy user in a 
developed country, and what are the implications for the satellite industry and the 
emergent players in Africa? 
 
Note that the terms “space industry” and “satellite industry” are sometimes used 
interchangeably. Since the goal of this research is to look at the way specifically end 
user needs are addressed in developing countries, the component of the space industry 
germane to this discussion is the satellite industry; namely those who commission and 
design satellites and take care of satellite-derived data. Increasingly, alternative high-
altitude vehicles, which are not satellites, also form part of this landscape.  
 
This study represents a novel view on the space industry, exploring some unchartered 
territory, gleaned after a lifetime’s working practice in academic, commercial and 
government settings. References supporting this view have not been readily available 
to support all statements, which have been formed through recent personal 
communication with industry practitioners as well as prior work experience. 
Technical and business rhetoric have been deliberately minimised, since these tend to 
be tautological and it is too easy to judge technical writing by its weight of acronyms 
and current business idiom, rather than by what it is attempting to convey. 
 
Methodologies used for this research are necessarily broad. The chief research 
method consists of desk research using both academic and commercial publications. 
Case studies and personal interviews are also used and explicitly described as such. 
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2	  
2 The user concept in the space and IT industries 
2.1 A	   case	   study	   illustrating	   the	   lack	   of	   socio-­‐political	   awareness	   of	  
the	  end	  user	  in	  the	  space	  industry	  
In the boardroom of a South African space engineering company several engineers, 
including the author, met in 2016 to discuss a funding opportunity for Earth 
Observation projects in Africa. This was driven by a well-resourced national space 
agency which had drawn up a project specification for a targeted domain: agri-tech. 
The Request For Proposals included data about the agricultural sector in various 
African countries. The purpose of the meeting was to determine whether it was worth 
putting together a consortium to address the vertical application suggested by the 
funding programme.  
 
In composition the meeting included highly educated senior technical personnel, and 
those who ran commercial engineering businesses; all satellite engineers. The 
discussion covered a possible business model and the complexities of involving 
different entities, from legal to engineering to government. Since the domain was 
agri-tech, a use case was discussed, and the prime user in this use case was ‘the 
farmer’.  
 
Assumptions were immediately made about this user which were not challenged in 
the meeting. It was taken for granted that this farmer was a relatively wealthy, 
resourced and capacitated individual. He (always, he) owns his land, and has a 
computer linked to the Internet, but he probably won’t be able to perform image 
processing. The assembled agreed that he would need to receive information, not raw 
data. When pressed, they presented a fairly detailed description of this farmer, his 
habits, his car, his workers, his social and work context, his needs and aspirations. 
 
Discussions focussed for a while on the nature of image processing, on the type of 
images he would need in order to make decisions regarding crop management, and 
other types of Earth Observation (EO) data. There was further discussion about the 
type of machines he may have and the image resolution he may require commensurate 
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with his plot size, type of crop etc. The putative imager on the satellite’s payload was 
conjectured at some length, constellation characteristics for the area of Africa to be 
viewed, and general type of satellite required. Finally, the market size was considered; 
how many land-owning IT-savvy farmers are there in South Africa? Is this really 
worth it? 
 
The data sheet handed out before the meeting and provided by the funding agency 
contained information about the farming sector and about the beneficiary (user) of the 
project. This is what it said about them: 
‘The project aims to reach out to support a minimum 150,000 smallholder 
farmer households in three-five years. Seventy per cent of the target 
beneficiaries will be women.’ 
 
Although the assembled had access to the document describing the target user, they 
preferred, and adopted, their own concept of the farmer when formulating the use 
case. In fact, when the actual beneficiary target was pointed out to them, the 
assembled immediately lost interest as the beneficiaries were perceived as too 
difficult to reach, insufficiently wealthy, and did not represent a worthwhile 
endeavour, even though the market size was far greater than originally thought. The 
meeting disbanded a few minutes later. 
 
This case study presents first-hand a scenario where a user concept in a developing 
country context is unexamined, and a project thrown out on account of a poorly 
understood user concept. The image in Figure 2.1 is not what the engineers visualised 
when they imagined the concept of ‘farmer’. There may well have been many other 
worthy reasons why this project was not undertaken, but the primary decision to reject 
it was based on a lack of understanding of the user. 
 
This vignette provides the rationale for this research, and leads onto a more thorough 
examination of user concepts and how they shape satellite and mission design. This 
chapter explores the concept of the user in the space and IT industries, and the 
position the user occupies in the design process. It exposes the boundaries of the 
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space industry and asks whether these boundaries are helpful in creating proper 
alignment between user needs and industry solutions. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: A Ugandan farmer in Entebbe District (author's photograph taken 
in 2000). 
2.2 The	  scope	  of	  the	  space	  and	  satellite	  industries	  
Sending rockets into space, the Cold War, and putting a man on the Moon, are 
common public conceptions of what the space industry does, and historically fairly 
accurate. Military and science applications have been the mainstay of space activities 
since the 1950s, but with time, space technology and its functions have moved 
increasingly into the civilian realm. Telecommunications, entertainment, the Internet, 
mobile telephony and a plethora of global navigation satellite systems and Earth 
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Observation applications mean that space technology reaches almost every person on 
the planet. Without satellites modern life would not continue in its present form. 
 
According to the well known space economist Pierre Lionnet, the space sector is 
defined as the industrial and institutional sector involved in the design, development 
and manufacturing of space systems. A space system is an infrastructure element with 
scientific, strategic or commercial objectives, with one or more critical components 
residing in outer space. This space system is composed of: 
 
- A space launch system 
- A spacecraft 
- A ground infrastructure 
Satellite TT&C, satellite uplink/downlink stations 
Launch sites (and tracking stations) 
- One or many consumer end-terminals (Lionnet, 2014) 
 
The consumer end-terminals (e.g. satellite receiver, GPS etc.) are not always 
considered as part of the space system, nor is the ensuing data. The applications 
which use space-derived data are also not usually considered part of the space system, 
according to Lionnet. In this paradigm, space systems are understood to comprise 
solely the ground-based and space-based technological elements involved in the 
collection, generation, and/or transmission of data. 
 
Governments continue to control space systems, and although commercial entities do 
design satellites and their ground segments, governments still perform an important 
regulatory function in space affairs and are still the predominant clients (i.e. funders) 
of the majority of space activities. 
 
As Lionnet argues, space powers are defined by their capacity to develop, produce 
and operate space systems. They are not evaluated according to end-user services 
using data derived from space. These services belong to different sectors of society 
and business. Evaluating the industrial (commercial) component of the space industry 
is very difficult. Few countries publish recurrent annual statistics of space industry 
activity. Mostly this is restricted to launch events, and does not cover downstream 
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services. Entities which use space-derived data are fragmented and encompass many 
disparate government, research, and commercial sectors. 
Figure 2.2: Satellite applications value chain (not to be reproduced without 
permission of copyright holder, P. Lionnet). 
 
Applications using data derived from space are not considered, by ‘space powers’ to 
be part of the space industry, but are considered instead part of other technology-
driven businesses, in particular the Information Technology (IT) sector. The IT sector, 
on the other hand, sees space as being just another location from which data can be 
extracted for their applications, and sees no obstacle in tackling the extraction of that 
data themselves, now that barriers to entry have fallen somewhat. This issue is further 
explored in Chapter 4 under the rubric of ‘disruptive technology’. 
 
Although the space industry sees itself as the developers of technologies to get objects 
into space, the space value chain shown in Figure 2.2 depicts the majority of the 
monetary value residing in the end user applications. The bias of space industry 
endeavour is not concentrated on the applications side of the space value chain. 
Applications are the functional units which end users engage with, and if the space 
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industry is not directly concerned with end users, then where in the value chain is this 
link made, and what are the consequences of this hiatus? 
 
Figure 2.3 shows satellites by their function, and these relate to the applications of 
those functions. In 2016, the majority lay in the commercial telecommunications 
sector (37%), and 51% of satellites were taken up by some form of communications. 
Only 14% of satellites operate as civilian remote sensing platforms, and 7% used for 
navigation applications. In terms of end user applications, that is, functions carried out 
by people directly using space data, these are in the minority in terms of numbers of 
satellites.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Operational satellites by function (State of the Satellite Industry Report 
2016, Satellite Industry Association, 2016). 
 
If the problem statement is that space-derived data languishes untouched in data 
vaults, and there are those who could use space data but cannot access the right 
format/periodicity/resolution etc., then it follows that there must be a gap between 
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supply and demand for a particular reason. This reason could well be due to the 
distance between end users and technology developers in the space industry. 
 
If we are not concerned with the part of the space industry value chain which builds, 
launches, and services satellites when considering impact on end users, then we are 
looking at the space applications and remote sensing sectors. This comprises many 
different types of application, many of which use space data quietly, i.e. the user does 
not need to be aware that the data that powers their application comes from space. 
Figure 2.4 shows a range of satellite services and applications. 
Figure 2.4: Satellite services and applications (Scott Madry, lecture slide, 2014). 
 
The services and applications shown here entail a wide range of different satellite 
sizes, orbital, and payload characteristics. Some of these will require a constellation of 
satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) whereas others will require one geostationary 
satellite. 
 
  12 
2	  
All of these services and applications have one thing in common: data. The data from 
the satellite is received by ground stations, processed, and variously distributed to 
players in the value chain who are involved in the creation of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs). Eventually, some of this data reaches end 
users, or is incorporated into programs beneficial to a user-oriented process.  These 
data and processes are taken up by those outside of the space industry itself (as 
identified by Lionnet and others), usually within the wide remit of the computer or 
digital technologies industries. 
2.3 The	  space	  mission	  user	  
For many space missions the user is obvious, in particular for military satellites, space 
probes and science missions, such as visits to nearby celestial objects, and this user is 
a highly educated, tech-savvy scientist. In such cases, where it is possible to define 
the user explicitly, the space community often devotes significant industry effort to 
developing user interfaces to maximise the scientific return of a given space mission. 
For example, NASA has a Human Computer Interfaces (HCI) group (part of the 
Ames Research Centre in Silicon Valley) who designed interfaces for the MARS 
Rover amongst other space mission tools. Here, the HCI is concerned with how 
scientists can manipulate highly technical tools. 
 
By contrast with the above situation, user in the EO and smaller satellite space 
projects, be they the maritime engineer who interprets SAR data, the disaster planner 
who purchases or curates satellite images, a person ordering an Uber taxi, or the client 
who approves a satellite payload design, is rarely made explicit and examined in any 
detail. This is a startling statement to make when any satellite engineer will attest to 
the careful interpretation of user requirements, and their importance in the design 
process (see Chapter 3). However a user requirement is not synonymous with a user, 
and neither is a ‘market’; both terms applied to a collection of putative users, usually 
in the commercial realm.  
 
Although this term ‘user’ is in common parlance, it has a more technical meaning 
when applied to the design and development of digital technology. In the early days 
of computing there was no sophistication in employing this term; a user was simply 
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somebody who sat in front of a computer terminal. The end user is defined now as 
specifically a human being who engages with a piece of IT. They may or may not, 
these days, have technical knowledge. A ‘user’ is also not necessarily a human agent. 
They could be another computer program, robot, or even a complex technical process 
involving many components. This study concentrates on the end user; the human 
being who has to interact with a piece of technology and for whom a technological 
artefact is created. Since these terms are not formalised, it is worth exploring other 
stakeholder terms used synonymously with the term ‘user’, and these are unpacked 
below. 
 
There are two realms in which the satellite engineer can conceive of their project: the 
commercial realm, which includes the value chain and business proposition, and the 
technical or design realm, where requirements are created and used as the basis for 
design work. Some design artefacts and processes span both realms. In small 
companies, which typically design smaller satellites, the same engineer will be 
involved with both business and technical matters. In a larger organisation, or for a 
larger space mission, most engineers will only be concerned with technical 
parameters. For the purposes of this discussion we look at the user concept and how 
broadly the user is treated for Earth Observation and small satellite programmes. 
 
The Client 
Within the space value chain, the relationship between the satellite designers and the 
client is crucial. This is the entity which pays the bills. User requirements (see below) 
are often created by or with the client, and this segment of design documentation 
dictates all future works and the eventual design and deployment of the satellite and 
its behaviour. This includes ground segment configuration, type of payload, size of 
satellite, orbital characteristics, constellation style (if more than one satellite), pass 
rates, and all non-operational data considerations. The satellite designers typically 
work only with the client to determine system requirements and do not communicate 
with the client’s stakeholders or have recourse to end users if they are at all in the 
picture. 
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The End User 
The end user may never be considered in the design of a satellite. That is, the people 
who will use the data derived from the satellite may not be (an important) part of a 
stakeholder map. To the satellite designers, these are the concern of the client and its 
stakeholders. They may even be unknown to the design engineers. The client may 
themselves have a client for whom they are procuring a satellite, for example a space 
agency procuring on behalf of a government department, and it may not even be this 
stakeholder who is concerned with the end user, but others who work in a different 
department within government, academia, research institutes and related 
organisations.  
 
In terms of applications using satellite data, the chain is even more lengthy and 
complex. The range is broad and encompasses almost every person on Earth: those 
who use weather forecasts, EO imagery, GPS-based tools such as Uber, the general 
Internet user, telephony, power generators, TV stations, navigators, and so on. These 
applications all have their business models and value chains, and the leaf node of 
those chains is the end user.  
 
The Consumer 
In terms of market analysis, the consumer is the individual who pays for a service. 
This is distinct from a beneficiary who benefits from a service such as a public good, 
but doesn’t directly pay for it. The consumer in a satellite value chain may not be 
tantamount to an end user. There is some ambiguity of terminology here. For 
example, a consumer may pay for satellite television services but is not an end user of 
technologies developed to bring that programme to their TV. 
 
The Beneficiary 
The beneficiary is the entity which will benefit from receiving the data, or from a 
service provided or enhanced because it receives data which has at some point derived 
from space. The beneficiary may not receive the data themselves, or ever manipulate 
it, process it, or even be aware that it exists. Nevertheless their lives are touched by 
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data which has come from space, and perhaps the entire enterprise of a space mission 
was conceived in order to address their concerns2.  
 
An example is provided in disaster management, where the beneficiaries may be 
citizens of a city. Satellite images show a sudden increase in cars in hospital car parks. 
This is the first sign of an epidemic in the absence of other visible causes (massive 
traffic accident, terrorist attack, tsunami etc.). Authorities are alerted and appropriate 
action taken. The beneficiaries are all those who may, or have, come into contact with 
an epidemic in the vicinity, where further disaster can be mitigated. 
 
The Market 
This is loosely referred to as a segment of amorphous and undifferentiated people 
who behave in a predictable or formulaic way, with common interests. Usually this 
term is applied when there is a commercial client or application.  
 
Society 
This term is often employed when referring to ‘civilians’ or non-military persons in 
general. It is used very loosely and usually without qualification by technologists in 
the space industry. The complex and two-way relationship between society and 
technology is a large research area that has been studied for a few hundred years. 
Some aspects of this are covered in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Given this plethora of different usages of the word ‘user’ and what this term could 
mean when applied to the design of a space mission, it is necessary to home in on 
what matters to the central argument; how does the conception of the user relate to the 
design process? Various methodologies are discussed below which have been and are 
being used by the IT industry with respect to understanding the user, but first it is 
worthwhile examining how the designer gets to that knowledge about the user. It is 
                                                
2 Satellite engineers schooled in the systems engineering approach and used to 
speaking of requirements may be confused by this reference to “concerns”. This is a 
term used in architecture design, and goes beyond specific requirements to encompass 
business and other wider interests. 
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interesting to compare the distance, or stages, between the end user and designer in 
the IT and space industries, and various scenarios are sketched out below. 
2.4 The	  IT	  user	  
IT has now become so pervasive and embedded in every day objects and processes 
that organisations no longer have an IT strategy. They may have technology roadmaps 
for specific value chains, and an IT department, but the latter are becoming service 
and support vehicles to the larger organisation, its offerings and clients. Technology 
creators have disrupted the normal boundaries of established industries, and continue 
to do so, the most famous example being the computer giant Apple, who took over the 
mobile phone sector. There are few industries untouched by the digital revolution of 
the past two decades. This includes the space industry. 
 
The role of IT Departments themselves has diminished as other groups take it upon 
themselves to develop and deliver technology-based services and products to markets 
without their intervention. Marketing departments in particular are bypassing IT and 
delivering products (applications) straight to their stakeholders, since they have 
become increasingly expert in the processing and distribution of data. As technology 
artefacts become increasingly consumer-driven, the marketing departments find 
themselves in the best position to specify and deliver what their customers want, 
while IT departments adhere to a technology push model of product development. 
Data itself has become highly commoditised, and expertise in its manipulation and 
monetisation is now seen as distinct from IT. In previous decades, data processing 
was firmly part of computing, but has now become decoupled and a separate industry 
in its own right. 
 
The effect of non-IT specialists developing data based products is disruptive to the 
established state of affairs. So-called disruption to the normal delivery chain can 
cause technical debt, a subject growing in topicality, as those who are not schooled in 
IT are increasingly engaging in technology creation and delivery. Technical debt is 
the accumulative effect of disregarding (especially non-functional) quality attributes 
in product development, resulting in eventual dysfunction of the developed system. A 
similar effect is being experienced in the space industry, where computer companies 
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and data providers are becoming involved in designing and developing satellites and 
managing the ground segment. Disruptive technology and technical debt are covered 
in Chapter 4, but it is not possible to give an overview of the IT industry without 
immediately pointing out its disruptive and pervasive nature, both of which have had 
an effect on the space sector. 
 
For the purposes of this research, the IT industry is that segment of developers and 
providers who create solutions for users involving specifically digital technologies, 
whatever market sector they inhabit.  Companies creating Information 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) began in the computing sector, designing and 
developing technologies connected to computers, and it is the history of this sector 
that is interesting to trace in the parallels it affords with the space industry.  
 
There are three distinct segments connected to IT germane to the argument of this 
thesis. The traditional IT or computing sector creates digital machines and programs 
to run on them. Secondly there is the increasingly prominent data sector: those who 
create, process, add value and resell data. Thirdly there is the Information System (IS) 
sector which combines digital technologies, organisations, individuals, data, and 
processes. Often the term IS is applied to administrative systems and not 
distinguished from computing in any way. Each of these facets of the IT industry 
shares a common history in its dealings with the end user, and methods for dealing 
with its user base.  
2.5 User	  Analysis	  	  
In the computing world there are many methods for eliciting user responses to 
technology and methods for characterising the user. These arise from a plethora of 
disciplines and actors involved in ensuring that what is produced is not only fit-for-
purpose, but is appealing and appropriate in every way for particular markets. 
 
It is worth sketching some of the history of end user involvement in early computing, 
around the 1980s. Early adopters of the Microsoft operating system and application 
software may recall the frustrations of doing battle with early incarnations of 
Windows. Apple Inc. (who arose from Xerox PARC) raised the bar in user-interface 
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design, realising that the more user-friendly and ambient the technology, the greater 
the returns. ‘Human Factors’, as anything non-technological involving human end 
users was termed, became fashionable, and some techniques for incorporating social 
factors were incorporated into actual system design processes.  
 
In the early days, human factors research concentrated on ergonomics and cognitive 
psychology, focusing on the individual human and their characteristics rather than, as 
later, the entire procedural and environmental context of a specific interaction. 
Several methods arose to analyse the human component, and a brief description of 
some of these is given below. Many of these methods remain popular to this day. 
2.5.1 Participatory	   design	   frameworks:	   JAD,	   ‘collective	   resources’	   approaches,	  
Technology	  Acceptance	  Model	  and	  others	  
The ‘socio-technical systems’ (Britain) and ‘collective resources’ approach 
(Scandinavia) came up with a broad set of techniques which could be termed 
‘Participatory Design’ containing diverse methods for sharing the process of design 
between users and technologists. This came from a less corporate and more socialist  
set of values than those prevalent in the US at the time. The project of Participatory 
Design was to alter work practices. System design was seen as part of an approach to 
change work organisation and workplace structures. 
 
Xerox PARC in the early 1980s was highly influenced by the European researchers, 
the author and associates included amongst their ranks.  Those who developed their 
novel user-centric Operating System and UI technologies went on to form Apple Inc, 
while the European research spawned Acorn Computers, who went on to become 
ARM Plc and other successful computer companies.  
 
Participatory Design empowers the individual worker to examine their own working 
practices, not only the products they produce. Total Quality Management (TQM) and 
Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) could both be said to be participatory design 
initiatives, where workers collude in their own re-organisation, and the customer 
(could be end user) becomes the focus of business unit activities. Both TQM and BPR 
transformed working practices and their outcomes (products) by placing the customer 
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and their goals first, over the authority of the technocrat. In traditional systems 
engineering by contrast, it is elegant technical solutions for which engineers are 
praised. 
 
One of the problematic aspects of end users is their lack of knowledge of their own 
practices, business processes and working contexts; much of this knowledge is 
implicit. Researchers encountered problems eliciting implicit knowledge and tacit 
skills, which must be represented in the delivered system. For the European socialist-
humanist perspectives, there was a greater recognition of the existence of politics in 
the workplace, conflicts of interest, and the unstructured nature inherent in the world 
of work, compared to their north American counterparts. 
 
The user interface was the locus and focus of interaction between the computer 
system and the outside world, and became paramount in terms of the perceived 
success of the entire Information System (IS). A prime method to address UI design 
for both the European and American companies has been to send engineers into the 
workplace to observe closely the context of the user, and to have unstructured as well 
as structured discourses with them. These practices informed much of the early design 
of user-interfaces and the information systems they served.  
 
IBM in America developed a practical methodology for involving users in design in 
1977 called Joint Application Design (JAD), which continues to be popular. A set of 
formalised workshops (JAD sessions) with a cohort of typical users and designers 
facilitated by a JAD specialist brings together various perspectives and addresses the 
integration of users’ needs as well as insight into corporate culture. This approach 
follows in the tradition of rationalist and functionalist design methodologies, where 
the problem (irrational users) can be contained by having them incorporated into a 
highly formalised and rational design programme.  
 
However the agenda of the JAD process was very much controlled and dominated by 
the engineers. The users’ influence on design is conveniently reduced to a well-
structured functional input to the design process, a process which always remains in 
the control of the expert designers (Asaro 2000). While JAD at least acknowledges 
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the importance of users in the entire process, it does not overturn the status quo with 
respect to the power relations between the technocrats and users, nor acknowledges 
the political context and ‘fundamental technical rationality’ of the process. 
Furthermore, the JAD process is only applied during the early requirements gathering 
phase and thus users are a means to an end of finalising a requirements specification. 
 
Understanding the user in the IT world is about more than creating a system which an 
individual can interact with on a technical basis. The system must fit within a 
workplace including business processes and a social framework. In addition, there are 
many subtleties involved in getting people to buy technology as well as buy into it, 
particularly if it is novel. Once a customer base is established there are further 
challenges in extending and prolonging customer loyalty. One of these subtleties is 
the distinction between actual use of a piece of technology and perceived ease of use.  
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) was created to draw out this distinction. 
 
TAM is a widely accepted tool to represent users’ decisions to adopt an information 
system, and their (perceived) satisfaction in using it. It combines ease of use and 
conformance to required functionality to predict continued use. It was originally 
developed to predict users’ initial adoption of an IS but has been extended as a tool to 
examine users’ relationships to a particular system. Its power lies in divorcing ease of 
use from perceived usefulness, which in itself is a more sophisticated view on the 
engineering-based view of satisfied requirements. Whereas at one time system testing 
would be carried out in laboratory conditions, testing against a series of quantitative 
measures determined beforehand, user testing is now carried out in situ and 
incorporates user perceptions and most importantly, qualitative responses. Lin and 
Silva (2005) remark that ‘What an individual perceives as ‘ease of use’ and 
‘usefulness’ may depend not only on intrinsic qualities of the information system but 
also on the changing contexts in which the information system is evaluated.’  
 
In IT, satisfied requirements, as is usual in engineered technology, are not paramount 
and by no means are the only measure of success. These measure internal 
conformance to technological parameters only. More important than these are user 
perceptions. These can be shaped by ephemera such as advertising, the price point of 
the product, and a wide variety of attributes such as legacy systems, interoperability, 
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maintainability, future proofing, and whether the CEO likes it. The TAM, as shown in 
Figure 2.5, diverges significantly from the engineering body of knowledge, and 
provides an example of how the IS world treats the user in their complex social 
environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
Figure 2.5: Simplified Technology Acceptance Model ((Hong et al. 2006). 
 
This model has been refined by (Venkatesh et al. 2003) as the unified theory of 
acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT). This is a technology acceptance model 
which aims to explain user intentions to use an information system and subsequent 
usage behaviour. The theory holds that there are four key constructs: 1) performance 
expectancy, 2) effort expectancy, 3) social influence, and 4) facilitating conditions. 
This has greater applicability in cases where cultural norms and business practices 
cannot be assumed, such as those where a system is implemented in a different 
context to that in which it was conceived or with which researchers are familiar. The 
UTAUT model and its variants have been used extensively in ICT4D (see below). 
2.5.2 The	  User	  Interface	  as	  a	  social	  and	  engineering	  problem	  
The traditional block diagram of an Information System shows a technical ‘core’ 
which performs the information processing. Data enters the system at one end, 
processing occurs, and information is output from the other end to, usually, an 
amorphous and undifferentiated user. 
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Usage	  
Intention	  
Perceived	  
Ease	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The IT-Based Information Processing block and the Human Information Processing 
block collude to produce the valuable Information in a ‘constructivist model’ where 
the user actively constructs sense out of the Information output. A degree of 
predictability is assumed at every stage. ‘Chaotic’ in the caption of Figure 2.6 means 
that behaviour is individualistic and thus ‘generic assertions may not be helpful in any 
given situation’ (Johnstone & Tate 2004). 
 
 
Figure 2.6: An IS model incorporating both systematic (IT-based) and chaotic 
(human) information processing (Johnstone & Tate 2004). 
 
In a traditional Information Systems view, ‘the usefulness of these outputs in creating 
meaning and information for the person receiving them are not of concern to the IS 
development team, once the requirements for the input or output have been agreed’  
(Johnstone & Tate 2004), consistent with the view of the IS guru, Thomas H 
Davenport, who in 1994 spotted that ‘technocrats are constantly caught off guard by 
the ‘irrational’ behavior of ‘end users.’ ‘ (Davenport 1994). 
 
Johnstone and Tate’s model describes human information processing as chaotic rather 
than systematic, meaning that the user behaves in a non-linear and unpredictable way. 
This is anathema to most engineers who seek to retire risk by ensuring as great a 
predictability in behaviour as possible. 
 
A field of study arose in the 1980s initially called the Man-Machine Interface (MMI), 
now Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). HCI is about ‘methods and tools for the 
development of human-computer interfaces’ and ‘draws on knowledge and skills 
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from psychology, anthropology and sociology’ (Preece & Rombach 1994). Software 
Engineering is concerned with how software is constructed; the core algorithms and 
hardware requirements are determinate. They contain within them the prestige, 
satisfaction and glory of solving a problem. The human side of the HCI on the other 
hand is indeterminate, and human users unpredictable. Even today the UI, which is at 
the centre of HCI, can be relegated and be an afterthought in information systems 
design.  
 
A case in point is the Square Kilometre Array radio astronomy project (SKA), whose 
Science Data Processor (SDP) is being designed by the author at the time of writing. 
The framework used for the design of the SKA is derived from space engineering, and 
ECSS3 standards are referred to for the core approach. It is requirements-driven, and 
most engineers would be familiar with the outputs of the design work: a Requirements 
Specification, Functional Decomposition, Product Breakdown Structure, etc. The 
(indirectly) user-facing ‘Delivery System’ is not seen as a core part of the project. The 
beating heart of the SDP comprises the algorithms that perform the information 
processing, and those which regulate compute power and resources. The user is rarely 
mentioned, and indeed the Delivery System has spent some of its design life as an 
adjunct to the SDP, and it has often been questioned whether it needs to be part of the 
budget cost cap. 
 
This is perhaps justified, since the SKA’s intended users are well known (research 
astronomers), and are certainly not the public at large. It is assumed that the users are 
technically proficient and will understand the products emerging from the SDP. In a 
project of this grandeur and size, it continues to mystify how minor a part the 
Delivery System plays in the overall design. In this century, it is normal in IS design 
that the user and their needs are placed centre stage. Since the SDP is not described as 
an IS, but as a processing system, the user and their needs are relegated to a secondary 
role. This is allowable and normal in a project which adopts development standards 
from the space industry. 
                                                
3 European Co-operation for Space Standardisation, the provider of standards for most space and 
satellite engineering activities on Earth (and off it). 
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2.6 Social	  context	  of	  the	  Information	  System	  
As pointed out by Asaro (2000), Joint Application Design serves to protect and 
promote the authority of technical experts, and is the chief aim of attempts to involve 
the user. His critique of these methods involved a strong political angle, and what he 
observed was a group of expert technologists interrogating potential users in 
unfamiliar settings, often divorced from the technology they were supposed to be 
evaluating.  
 
An important wave of UI design in ICTs comes from a key tool of anthropology: 
participant observation. This began to be employed as a technique to arrive at user 
experience in the late 1980s. Using this method, the researcher ‘poses’ as a ‘native’ 
and lives as closely as possible with their subjects. In this case, the engineer spends 
significant time shadowing users, noting what they do and how they interact with 
systems and processes in their organisations. Myers is one of the proponents of 
Design Ethnography, which goes beyond mere observation into active engagement 
with subjects during the period of research.  
 
Traditionally in ethnographic research, the ethnographer attempts not to interfere with 
their subjects. However in the post-modernist and post-structuralist epochs, this has 
been found philosophically bereft, in that it is impossible for the ethnographer to be 
objective and not to influence their subjects, in a kind of ‘Schrodinger’s Cat’ 
dilemma. Social Anthropology has sought to overcome this dilemma by admitting and 
exploring the anthropologist’s personal affect and effect. This has come to be known 
as ‘critical ethnography’ and been scantily applied to Information Systems research. 
Baskerville and Myers report that in the most part, ‘ethnographic research as currently 
described in the IS research literature does not include any active intervention on the 
part of the researcher’ (Baskerville & Myers 2015).  
 
They describe Design Ethnography as a relatively novel situation where the 
researcher acts as ‘expert’, performing two tasks at the same time: both observing and 
designing. This requires a considerable set of tools: immersion, interviews, social 
mapping, conversation analysis, archival research as well as ‘co-planning and co-
designing’ workshops. 
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While their fairly recent paper sets out a new and more complicated approach to 
eliciting actual system design from a set of users, it is illustrative of the lengths the IT 
industry can go to in ensuring that an information system will satisfy its users. The 
skills required to enter into this particular realm of socio-technological research are 
rare and rarefied, and unlikely to be found outside of academia. 
 
Note that there is no mention of UI design in this discussion of user requirements. 
These, along with other types of requirement may be more familiar to engineers in the 
space industry, but they are a design tool that is far too blunt to apply to the design of 
an information system. How this traditional engineering approach works with modern 
design frameworks is examined in the following chapter. 
2.6.1 Distance	  between	  technology	  designer	  and	  technology	  user	  
The brief history of user involvement in IT design shows that over time, the distance 
between the technologist and the user has decreased. The technologist now wishes to 
know intimately how their system will be used in situ, and what users feel about it 
both before they have acquired the technology and while they are using it. The IT 
industry invests greatly in this enterprise. What is meant by this decreasing distance is 
that the steps required to move from designer to user have diminished.  
 
In the early days of IT, the computing professional existed ‘in a kind of organizational 
priesthood’ (Holmes & Post 2002), and espoused a sort of disdain for users, where the 
uninitiated were to be avoided or pitied by the programmers. Operating systems 
required specialist skill and patience, training courses were necessary to learn any 
functional application, and experts could command high salaries. The closest 
computer professionals got to end users was through questions originating from the 
user base, posed to them by their long-suffering computer support teams, most of 
which were scoffed at.  
 
This state of affairs soon changed for several reasons. Users organised into 
communities and became powerful in their relationship to the IT industry. The 
industry itself grew and competition for users meant pleasing them became important 
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for sales. Computing power increased, allowing for better performance particularly of 
any graphical user interface. The games industry drove graphical capability, which 
influenced operating system performance and usability. Unix-based WIMPS 
(Windows Icons Menus and Pointer Systems) were copied by all manufacturers and 
became the norm before computing shrank to the size of a mobile phone and we now 
have apps to carry out many computing functions. It wasn’t only hardware 
improvements which changed ICTs but a change of heart in the computer industry, as 
it was seen that technology devices and computers with better user interfaces rapidly 
gained market traction. Consumer applications came to be designed for usability and 
it became important for the designers to know their clientele intimately.  
 
The distance between technology designer and end user has had to decrease, to enable 
the developer or designer to understand the user better. In the IT world, it is usual for 
there to be several methodologies in place to allow the developer to access and 
understand their users. This is what one would expect in a consumer industry. While 
the space industry does not see itself as in the business of creating consumer products, 
the data created by space technologies most certainly is taken up by consumers. In 
various parts of the space industry, the end user or consumer is far removed from the 
engineer/designer or developer. Figures 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 below show the typical 
distance between these actors. 
 
Firstly, in the software industry, as would be expected, there is one step to the end 
user from the software developer. The developer can interrogate the user directly 
through the mechanisms of Beta trials, JAD sessions, TAM, and many other methods 
as discussed, including having user representatives in their Agile teams. ‘To be most 
effective, computing professionals should work as closely as possible with the 
workers they support’(Holmes & Post 2002). Additionally, researchers and other 
experts are at their disposal, and the organisations employing the developer are 
equally concerned to create artefacts that the user will find palatable. 
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Figure 2.7: Distance from designer to user in the contemporary software industry. 
 
The space industry, like the computing industry, is multi-faceted. On the whole there 
is an extremely large gulf between the designing engineer and the end user of the 
artefacts emerging from the far end of the value chain. There are many reasons for 
this: as pointed out at the outset the space industry sees itself as the purveyor of 
satellites, probes, space ships and a controlling ground segment. The ‘user segment’ is 
not central to their activities.  
 
There are some parts of the satellite industry that are more concerned with the end 
user: those who provide entertainments in the form of satellite TV, or extra-terrestrial 
telephony and Internet services: these are named Fixed Satellite Services (FSS), 
Broadcast Satellite Services (BSS), and Mobile Satellite Services (MSS). A new 
generation of High Throughput Satellites (HTS) that can re-use frequency bands will 
replace many of these. However for these sectors, the user is mediated by other 
service providers. Those who deliver programming or telephony services to the user 
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represent a complex value chain in themselves, even though there has been recent 
consolidation of actors in this market. The satellite developers themselves do not 
usually provide end user applications in telephony and broadcasting. There is a 
growing number of subdivisions of communications satellite markets (Pelton, 2017), 
but just to examine the value chain in Broadcast Satellite Services it is obvious that 
there are many links from end user (viewer/audience) to satellite specifier. There is a 
complex relationship from those who determine programming for the consumer, and 
those who procure satellites. The consumer watches a programme; the broadcast 
service constitutes a host of players who collaborate to produce a suite of 
programming; the technology users are those who create the devices and dishes to 
receive the broadcast signal. A complex web of regulations, government entities, and 
commercial organisations occupy this chain, as shown in Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8: Simplified model of distance from designer to user in the Broadcast 
Satellite Services industry. 
 
The satellite industry generally designs payloads and satellite componentry for their 
clients. Their design engineers are fairly remote from the end user, as shown in a 
simplified model in Figure 2.9 and their work is mediated through several agents. The 
Government-Client-Engineering-Engineering Company chain can involve many 
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intermediary organisations. There can be ‘at least 20 organisations between the 
satellite designer and the end user’ reports one satellite engineer currently working on 
small satellite design projects.  
 
Figure 2.9: Simplified model of distance between designer and user in the traditional 
satellite industry.  
 
The question as to why this distance should matter to those connected to the space 
industry is answered by examining parallels to the computing sector. Through time, as 
shown above, the computing industry has become increasingly concerned and 
connected to its users for commercial reasons. The fact that those who design 
satellites are disconnected from their user base suggests that what they design may not 
address users’ concerns, and this may explain the gap central to this thesis between 
the space data provided by existing space systems, and the needs of markets for space  
applications. At each link in the chain (or node), a message becomes eroded. The 
clients, often governments whose term is of a particular duration, are not concerned 
about closing the loop between technology and need, once their Key Performance 
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Indicators have been satisfied. For some sectors of the space industry, this may not 
matter since their outputs and products are never evaluated by end users or 
consumers. This was the thinking in the early days of computing, and it was those 
who could reach out to end users who gained market prominence. The role of 
disruptive technologies plays a large part in the story of who has succeeded, and 
Chapter 4 will explore how far this is true in the space industry. 
Figure 2.10: Distance to user from NewSpace companies. 
 
‘NewSpace’ is a term given to a relatively recent wave of companies who are 
disrupting the status quo in the space industry. The case of the NewSpace disruptive 
companies is an interesting one. Figure 2.10 depicts the important facets of the 
relationship between them and users. Markets for space data are not necessarily well-
defined by all NewSpace companies, but it is these rather than the end users 
themselves that drive their business models. There is a subtle distinction between 
markets and users. Whereas the IT industry was concerned (initially at least) with 
individual user experiences, both in terms of the ergonomic experience, ease of use 
and fit-for-purpose, NewSpace industries are aiming for markets for space data, and 
moreover intend to develop new markets. It appears that there are two types of 
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NewSpace business: those producing products for broad usage such as Planet, and 
those aiming for vertical4 data markets such as Spire. 
 
A lack of awareness of the business, social and political context of the user gives rise 
to risks of producing artefacts that the user does not want and cannot use. Behind the 
NewSpace model shown in Figure 2.10 there is no precise formulation of the end 
user, and this indicates a risk. High-tech companies can be quite comfortable 
operating in this environment if they can convince investors that there will be an 
eventual market for their products. The Design Engineer in this model creates systems 
and artefacts whose eventual use case(s) may not be mapped out. It is anticipated that 
only some NewSpace companies will prevail, and just as with the dotcom boom this 
will not be predictable. As with the traditional satellite system, in this model it is left 
to the IT sector to create the applications that people will use. 
 
Although an end user application may be developed by the IT industry which 
ultimately gleans its data from space, the fact that the data itself is agnostic of that 
usage means that it cannot have been tailored for that application. For some, that 
doesn’t matter, since the data is highly generalizable. GPS data for example is used by 
many end user applications, and when GNSS systems were designed and launched, 
they had no cognisance of the likes of UberEATS.  However this study questions 
whether the space industry is wise to regard the end user as ‘someone else’s problem’.  
 
What follows is a case study in the design and implementation of an IS which did not 
take local politics and local practice into account. Although this does not use 
specifically space-derived data, it serves to illustrate the problem, and is a rare 
example of an IT project designed for and implemented in a developing country. The 
gap between the end users and the designers was culturally and geographically very 
large, resulting in this case in a failure to achieve the aims of the project. 
  
                                                
4 Vertical markets address a specific function e.g. agritech 
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2.7 Case	   study	   showing	   the	   perils	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   socio-­‐political	  
awareness	  in	  IS	  design:	  computerising	  the	  Ugandan	  judiciary	  
In the late 1990s the Danish aid agency DANIDA decided to support the Ugandan 
judiciary by computerising caseload. The desired end result was to shorten waiting 
periods for accused awaiting trial, the majority of whom were innocent and could die 
while in prison. AIDS and malaria, overcrowding and neglect combined to erase the 
problem of lengthy trial periods in the worst way possible.  
 
A further human rights abuse in the court system was that court officials were 
routinely bribed by wealthy relatives of some accused, while other inmates with 
poorer connections languished for longer and had a greater chance of dying while in 
custody. The court backlog was several years. 
 
The author was in charge of the development of the judicial information system, 
which was composed of a fairly simple database-driven architecture and standard GUI 
for populating and retrieving information from the database. The system was duly 
installed, but it was plain to see that, although it had the potential to lend efficiency to 
the administration of caseload, it could not address the central iniquity of the system.  
 
Firstly, the judges were limited in number and could only handle a set number of 
cases at any given time. Secondly, while under the paper system court officials were 
bribed to ‘lose’ or ‘find’ case files and change their rank on the court listing, now with 
the electronic system they could be bribed in exactly the same way. Although case 
files could not be technically lost (networks and backups were a routine component of 
the system) nevertheless criteria for selecting a hearing remained corrupt, and not 
based on any rational formula, such as length of time spent awaiting trial, type of 
offence, etc. Sadly it made no difference whether or not there was a paper or 
electronic system in place determining court appearance to the human rights issue. 
Millions were mis-spent.  
 
Essentially DANIDA and various other stakeholders had not thought through the 
social and political aspects of the user or their work environment. They had 
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transposed a particular set of values and socioeconomic conditions to an entirely 
different country and situation. The DANIDA project manager, a highly trained legal 
expert, bemoaned the poor salaries of the court administrators who were not paid a 
living wage. In Uganda very few were, and even middle-class wages could not cover 
the demands from friends and relatives on the person with that rare commodity of a 
decent job. It was beyond the remit of the aid agency to interfere with Human 
Resources matters in the Ugandan judiciary, and it would have probably made no 
difference if they could, given the prevailing general poor economic conditions in the 
country and high incidence of bribery and corruption. 
 
If an anthropologist, or one more sensitive to local socioeconomic conditions had 
been sent to design a system to lessen waiting time for court cases, they would most 
probably have designed it according to an entirely different approach, perhaps not 
involving IT at all. However in this case, once the technical ball had started rolling it 
was very hard to stop, as benefits such as ‘modernisation’ are thought of as 
coterminous with ‘computerisation’, and the project, crucially, had high prestige and a 
high price tag. The feedback loop from evaluator to aid agency, if honest, would not 
have resulted in a different UI or system. Aid agencies have a high churn rate 
particularly of field professionals. 
 
This story illustrates several points central to this thesis: social factors are often 
ignored in system design; prestige continues to dominate high-level funding 
decisions, and beneficial outcomes are rarely attributed to a deft application of social 
factors research (or the converse). The IT industry may fare better than the space 
industry in its attitude to and treatment of the user, but the relationship is not perfect. 
 
Although this story is concerned with a terrestrial information system in a developing 
country, similar stories play out when connected to applications which derive their 
data from space, and these are covered in Chapter 5. What follows examines how the 
initial scoping of a problem determines design decisions, and how architectural 
frameworks in different technological spheres including in the space industry 
compare with each other. 
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3 Architecture frameworks in the space and IT 
industries 
Chapter 2 discussed the user and user concept in the Space and IT industries, probing 
the relationship between the development of space technology and end users, which 
takes place within an overarching architectural framework. In this chapter we turn our 
attention to the architecture frameworks themselves, and trace how the user concept is 
carried through from concept to design and eventual deployment. We turn the 
magnifying glass on that initial phase and examine the relationship between user 
requirements and the space value chain. 
3.1 Space	  industry	  ontologies	  and	  boundaries	  
The space industry uses particular ontologies for describing its activities. These have 
arisen historically, based on sending objects into space during the Cold War. A 
‘mission’ is different to a ‘project’ in one important way: it involves a ‘missive’, an 
object sent forth, and this missive is intimately connected to the goals of the project. 
This conception of a space project carries throughout, from initial idea to eventual 
‘deployment’. The user is not centre-stage; the missive (satellite/probe and payload) is 
key. 
 
The mission, like its core missive, has a linear trajectory. Both technical and financial 
stages of the mission have their own known characteristics. Specialist engineers are 
engaged for particular stages and there are other expected resources attached to each 
phase. These phases are understood by all connected to the project, and each phase 
entails a particular list of deliverables, milestones and achievements. 
 
The IT industry does not concern itself with a missive. End goals may be diffuse and 
not clearly linked to a technical development per se but instead, business goals. The 
user concept is strong in the IT industry, and in the early days 1950s – 1960s, there 
was one user concept, and this was the operator. This operator was educated, highly 
technical and proficient in the use of programming languages that demanded thorough 
knowledge of the hardware of a particular machine. By contrast, in the space industry 
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the user is coterminous with the client. The end user, the person who will actually use 
the data, is the province of the application generators who are not part of the space 
industry: these exist in telecommunications, entertainment, university research units, 
and increasingly at large in the general public, as described in Chapter 2. 
 
Satellite engineers see themselves in an analogy with the IT industry as the space 
equivalent of “chip designers”, who provide the platforms for collecting data from 
space. They are developing multi-purpose machines which only need to compete with 
other satellites. The end user is far down the value chain and taken care of by those 
who have use for the data returning from satellites. They see themselves as part of the 
space industry and a value chain whose end users are serviced by components beyond 
themselves and the space industry. They may analyse user requirements, and validate 
those requirements, but this is not a wide-angle exercise in new application creation. 
They do not see themselves as data providers, who happen to derive their data from 
space. A company which does just this is Spire, and their success story is described in 
the following chapter.  
 
The hypothesis in this study is that, by relegating the user concept and focusing only 
on client requirements to drive satellite design, or at least payload design, the space 
industry is missing large potential new markets for space-derived data, and 
inadequately specifying payloads.  
 
3.2 The	  value	  chain	  in	  the	  IT	  industry	  and	  the	  space	  industry	  
The value chain in both the space and IT industries is complex and there is no one 
blueprint. There is a great deal of overlap in technologies, design and development 
approaches between these industries, so much so that satellites have been described as 
‘computers in the sky’, and increasingly, as we show in Chapter 4, the IT industry is 
encroaching into traditional space territory. In fact in the State of the Satellite Industry 
Association Report 2005, they are described as ‘super-computers in the sky’ in 
recognition of the increasing processing power of many modern satellites. 
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Grimard’s view of the space value chain places ‘Value Added Services’ and 
‘Consumers’ as the end-point of the chain, and hopes that profits from end user 
services can feed into expensive space infrastructure, whilst acknowledging the 
complex and fragile mechanisms which link these various actors (Grimard 2012). In 
his view, shown in Figure 3.1, there is a timeline from the satellite manufacturer 
through launch services, lease of satellite capacity, through to value-added services 
and thence to consumers. This is the typical mission pattern mentioned earlier, where 
the value chain is described as a project, or mission, which has a beginning, middle 
and end. The mechanism by which the end product can tie back into the start (space 
infrastructure) is not explicit in his research.	  
 
In reality there are many links between ‘Value Added Services’ and the ‘Consumer’ 
in Grimard’s chain. If the consumer is a mobile phone user requesting an Uber, or 
downloading weather stats onto a mobile app, the chain from data acquisition to the 
end user is almost intractable. In fact, in the examples of Uber and many other mobile 
phone apps, they would not classify themselves as space applications, although, in the 
case of Uber, it relies on satellites not only for the basic telephony services but also 
vehicle tracking and navigation. 
 
	  
                    Figure 3.1: The space value chain (Grimard, 2012). 
	  	  
Situating a business model within a space value chain is not a predictable low-risk 
occupation. The European Space Agency created the Sentinel constellation believing 
that there would be general consumer markets for EO data, but, as they failed to 
materialise, have had to offer this imagery as a public good. The United States’ GPS 
is another case in point, where a space technology was made available to the world at 
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large and has had massive consequences in terms of public benefit through an 
explosion of useful (and unforeseen) applications. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Space markets organisation (reproduced by kind permission of P. 
Lionnet).  
 
 Rather than describe the many specific value chains in the IT and space industries it 
may be more enlightening for the purposes of this argument, to see how space 
markets are organised. Figure 3.2 shows a view of space markets from the space 
industry perspective. Note the distinction made here between the 
‘civilian/Military/Scientific user’ and ‘Consumers’ and ‘Companies’. Given the 
military history of space endeavours and government procurement bias, this view 
does not characterise markets in terms of consumers with any sophistication.  
3.3 Situating	  the	  user	  in	  space	  mission	  design	  
Schlagert wrote in 1953, about the new field of Systems Engineering that: 
‘The first stage, planning, is really an investigation of user needs, commercial 
or military. This stage is of value not only to the engineering department but 
also to the success of the organization as a whole. This area constitutes the 
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weakest phase at present, since it demands the broadest background. Few 
engineers are trained in the fields of economics, psychology and marketing.’  
 
There are now highly developed methodologies for all phases of systems engineering. 
Unlike in 1953, current university engineering programmes teach systems engineering 
routinely. Satellite missions are firmly embedded in systems engineering lore, and it 
is the method chosen to address how to progress from a broad mission concept to 
actual deployment of a satellite system. That system, from end-to-end, comprises 
recognisable industry standard phases using common reference models, such as has 
been published by the European Co-operation for Space Standardisation (ECSS) in 
many large volumes.  
 
The ECSS documentation includes an element called ‘Human Factors’ which ‘defines 
requirements for the integration of the human in the loop for space system products’ 
(Secretariat ECSS Executive, 2008). However this refers to the human being in-flight 
or at a ground station; this human is not an end user. Applications, especially in the 
current mobile sense which use space-derived data are not germane to the ECSS 
standards, and the creation of such applications often falls outside the scope of a space 
mission. 
 
In the usual systems engineering approach, each phase builds on the outputs of the 
prior phase, and thus the primary phase is the most influential. Underpinning the 
systems engineering method is the notion that design problems must be corrected as 
close as possible to the outset, as they become increasingly difficult and costly to 
solve with time. The first phase is requirements analysis and there are entire fields of 
enquiry, conferences and journals devoted to Requirements Engineering (RE) and 
Requirements Definition Management (RDM). 
 
Because the entire end-to-end process of space mission design and deployment is very 
complex and technically demanding, its methods and techniques form a complete, 
established body of knowledge which the student engineer covers at university level. 
However, the engineer is not trained to use any formal analytical framework to 
establish who the end users are, or how to identify them. The ‘human factors’ material 
  40 
3	  
in the ECSS standard texts does not cover such end users. Simply put, the training of 
satellite engineers and mission designers reinforces the status quo, i.e. that the space 
mission begins with technical requirements and ends at the ground station, and is a 
highly technological undertaking involving, primarily, machines.  
 
Interestingly, formal frameworks for engineering which originated from space and 
heavy engineering have been adopted variously by computer industries. Computer 
programmers are often called ‘software engineers’, and most professionals in the IT 
industry will be familiar with architecture frameworks, whose origins may have come 
from space engineering. The IT industry, especially software development, has an 
ambivalent relationship to these methods, and by and large have adapted them for 
their own use. This is especially so in the part of the computer industry with the most 
user-intensity: Information Systems. 
3.4 Life-­‐cycle	  methodologies	  
The profession of Information Systems didn’t emerge until the 1950’s when 
computers were first applied to data processing and management problems. This early 
‘pre-methodological’ phase could be characterised by ‘seat-of-the-pants’ approaches 
to systems design. Systems design was driven by the management of physical data, 
storage and retrieval concerns. Eventually roles became differentiated, and more 
formal methods were borrowed from the engineering worlds.  
 
When, in the 1960s, standardized methodologies emerged, the IT industry adopted the 
‘life-cycle’ view. This describes a series of stages beginning with requirements 
definition, through defining the components necessary for the system, through to 
algorithm creation, then managing the programming and testing of the system. 
Consulting users was not performed systematically, and users were frequently only 
brought in, if at all, during the final stages of the testing phase. If anything, future 
users were consulted through informal interviews during the initial requirements 
gathering phase, or perhaps during an evaluation of the commissioned system post-
implementation. 
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In computer programming and systems design, the most prominent method is called 
the ‘Waterfall Model’, often referred to as the Systems Development Life Cycle 
(SDLC). The example below (Figure 3.3) is taken from a State University of New 
York course, but there are many variants, most involving Deployment or Maintenance 
phases. This diagram shows the Waterfall Model at its most simplistic, with feedback 
loops between some of the phases.  
 
The Waterfall Model has been much refined and criticised but continues to underpin 
much systems design, even for those involved in the more modern Agile 
developments (see below). Its main advantage is that it highlights the importance of 
getting early design right. More recent techniques in software system development 
eschew the notion of any determinant rightness, but concede that it is more important 
to be happy than right, and the aim of a successful operational system is happy end 
users. Technical correctness, fit for purpose, and internal alignment between phases 
are not in themselves sufficient to produce user-delight. To an engineer or developer, 
elegant solutions and algorithms are most important, but not to the user and many 
other stakeholders. 
 
The main criticism of the Waterfall Model is its tardiness and massive latency 
problems, and this has ramifications for the space industry and disruptive 
technologies. By the time each stage has been completed, verified, and an authority 
has cleared progression to the next stage, years may have elapsed. By the time 
systems testing is performed and, most essentially, the users are confronted with a 
Beta Release, competitors are at large, and clients frustrated. Efforts to accurately 
predict particularly software development durations, are notoriously over-optimistic. 
Inevitably, given the lack of early prototyping and exposure to or involvement of end 
users, the Beta Release is woefully lacking, and it’s back to square one. 
 
The very name of the model betrays the fundamental problem with this method. A 
waterfall is a one-way journey, an ineluctable cascade; in reality IT development is 
cyclical. In the author’s experience in the IT industry an entire new computer had to 
be brought to market every 6 months, including chip set, operating system, 
Application Program Interfaces, programming languages, user applications, plus all 
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associated marketing. A one-way Waterfall Model with its concomitant 
documentation and authorisation-heavy procedures cannot produce a novel computer 
in 6 months. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The Systems Development Lifecycle (SDLC) or Waterfall Model.  
 
The Waterfall Model encourages poor communication between individuals and teams 
as functions are specialised and require authorised procedures and documents, and 
there is over-reliance on milestones rather than day-to-day problem-solving. A great 
length of time elapses before any examples of prototypes can be seen by stakeholders, 
and over-hierarchical management structures slow down each component of the 
process.  
 
In response to this, the IT industry became somewhat anarchic, relying on highly 
talented individuals to carry through design and implementation in the absence of 
procedures and documentation. The companies that survived this epoch in the early 
1980s were those whose people lived, played, and worked together and therefore had 
exceptionally good communications, precluding the need for heavyweight procedures. 
This became recognised in the IT industry and so-called Agile methodologies were 
developed in response. 
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Agile, as the name suggests, is a flexible and swift approach to software development 
which entails very early and rapid prototyping of small components, and small teams 
with daily communication rituals. Flat hierarchies are encouraged, which further aids 
communication. Teams are multi-functional, cutting across traditional functional 
silos, and the end user is often a member of a team in some way. Documentation is 
only created for specific purposes and often only on demand. Architecture-related 
documents do not need to be comprehensive.  
 
Certain aspects of Agile methods would not be tolerable to a space mission design 
environment, where the chief aim is to retire risk. This entails considerable time and 
effort applied to thorough documentation, and ‘sign-off’ junctures where experienced 
authorities approve designs before continuing, introducing delays. Moreover, the 
entire process is predicated on the first stage, requirements, and these are contentious. 
 
In response to the inadequacies of both the Waterfall Model and Agile frameworks, 
new approaches have been created to marry the best of both; for example the Scaled 
Agile Framework. Some version of this has been practiced by many organisations 
who find Agile only useful for development and not for product release. In software 
houses product release typically occurs according to marketing timelines and not 
development milestones, and this is a major departure from space missions. 
Separating development from products would not work with a traditional systems 
engineering framework for space, with attendant milestones that rest on development 
design reviews (PDR, CDR etc.). 
3.4.1 Concurrent	  Engineering	  
In recognition of the pitfalls of the Waterfall Model, some parts of the space industry 
have adopted the practice of Concurrent Engineering. This is a design optimisation 
approach whereby teams develop separate functions or products simultaneously, by-
passing the need to wait for one task to finish before another can start. The method 
relies on good communications between teams, using computer modelling and design 
techniques where certain parameters and models must be shared. The European Space 
Agency has built a Concurrent Design Facility and this is used for space mission 
development. Concurrent Engineering has been practiced for about 20 years, but is 
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not established practice in the space industry. It also doesn’t address the fundamental 
problem of addressing the end user’s needs and incorporating them into requirements 
and thence design. 
3.5 Requirements:	  a	  critique	  
Space mission design rests on the correct formulation and validation of requirements. 
An increasing proportion of technical work involves software, but the application of 
Requirements Engineering to software development is flawed. Ralph, in  ‘The illusion 
of requirements in software development’ polemically states that ‘many software 
development projects may have no useful requirements’ (Ralph 2013). Not all 
programmers are schooled in engineering, and there are often severe time constraints 
and chronic under-estimation of time required to produce a finished software product.  
 
The European Space Agency’s Software Engineering and Standardisation web page 
admits: ‘Requirements engineering is currently identified as one of the weak points of 
the software development lifecycle.’  
 
An increasing amount of effort in satellite projects is being dedicated to software 
development and maintenance. The Software Engineering Institute on the subject of 
Requirements Engineering: 
‘Requirements engineering is complex because of the three roles involved in 
producing even a single requirement: the requestor (referred to as the ‘user’ in 
the IEEE definition), the developer (who will design and implement the 
system), and the author (who will document the requirements). Typically, the 
requestor understands the problem to be solved by the system but not how to 
develop a system. The developer understands the tools and techniques 
required to construct and maintain a system but not the problem to be solved 
by that system. The author needs to create a statement that communicates 
unambiguously to the developer what the requestor desires. Hence, 
requirements address a fundamental communications problem.’ 
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It is assumed that the user (requestor) understands their problem. However in high-
technology situations, the user often does not, particularly the end user, and herein 
lies a further problem to add to the communications issues identified above.  
 
When engineers talk of sound requirements, the emphasis is on their composition as 
statements. A requirement must satisfy a host of criteria, is a precise, technical 
formulation, and most importantly can be verified. We can agree that soundly 
composed requirements are important; they are a necessary step in development, but 
not sufficient to bring about the result of a useful, appropriate product.  
 
At its most general, a requirement is a ‘documented demand to be complied with’ 
ECSS (ECSS-S-ST-00-01C1 Glossary of Terms. 2012). In practice requirements 
quickly become complex (see Figure 3.4). IEEE Standard 830-1998 states that ‘‘a 
requirement specifies an externally visible function or attribute of a system [while] a 
design describes a particular subcomponent of a system and/or its interfaces with 
other subcomponents’’  
 
Requirements themselves should contain certain attributes. A valid requirement must 
meet many criteria, including: 
 
• Factual Correctness – is factually correct 
• Completeness – sufficiently complete 
• Consistency – the absence of conflict within, and between, requirements 
• Clarity – the syntax is easily understandable by the intended reader 
• Non-ambiguity – there is a single semantic interpretation of the requirement 
• Traceability – permits unambiguous requirements traceability in design and verification 
• Verifiability – the requirement is such that (1) its satisfaction in the design is verifiable, and 
(2), its satisfaction in the implementation is verifiable 
• Singularity – only one actor, one action and or one object of action per unit of time 
• Feasibility – some means of satisfaction exists 
• Non-Redundancy – not duplicated within the set of requirements 
 
From Square Kilometre Array Systems Engineering L1 Requirements Analysis 
Guidelines. Private notes, January 2014. 
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Figure 3.4: ECSS space system requirement types (ECSS-E-10-B). 
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When considering applications using space-derived data, what we have in mind is 
information delivered to an end user. Modern software development does not 
distinguish strongly between design, development and deployment. What does this 
mean in terms of user requirements? If there is no well-defined path from initial user 
requirements through to design, development, then culminating in deployment as in 
the typical engineering-style waterfall model, how can a project ever be said to be 
done and how can commissioning take place? The answer is that software 
development proceeds cyclically and iteratively; perfection is not sought, and ‘done’, 
and is a matter of contractual agreement not bound to the validation and verification 
of requirements. This is quite a different scenario to space engineering, despite the 
earlier assertion that there is an increasing amount of software in satellite design. 
 
Ralph raises philosophical problems with requirements worth exploring, since these 
are critical to the entire space mission design. His two principal objections are 
ontological and epistemological. There is a third, which is that the engineering 
approach is altogether missed by many software development enterprises, which 
adopt a more fluid approach, even where architectures for design and development are 
taken very seriously.  
 
His ontological challenge points out that where there are many approaches to 
achieving a goal, there may be insufficient overlap between approaches to form solid 
requirements. This holds true where there is a relationship between features and 
requirements. Most engineers are trained to think in terms of functions, whereas a 
feature can be an attribute which does not contribute towards a goal in and of itself. 
Ralph puts forward this definition of a requirement in relation to a goal: ‘A 
requirement is a feature of a design object that is necessary to achieve a goal’ and yet 
even given this definition, a software object may contain many features which do not 
substantially contribute towards any goal. 
 
Requirements do not form the mainstay of design for most software projects. 
Software is not designed according to requirements per se. Attributes have gained 
more prominence, and the Software Engineering Institute now espouses Attribute 
Driven Design and other methods over the Waterfall Model (see below). 
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An entire space mission is predicated on the correct gleaning of requirements. A mass 
of work is in place to ensure that the design and eventual deployment meet the 
requirements specification. In most scenarios in the space industry, this requirements 
specification has been arrived at in consultation between client and engineering 
company, and that client is often government or an intermediary representing 
government. Requirements are often narrowly defined in terms of a particular 
operation, and those in government specifying the requirements are often themselves 
engineers.  
 
This scenario contains several problems: 
1. It misses the user applications arena 
2. There is a large time lag from initial consultations with users to design and 
deployment. 
3. The eventual end user of space-derived data is sometimes unknown and 
unanticipated at the time of space mission design. This means that the data 
type may not be commensurate with the needs of users. 
4. Users as defined in the space mission are frequently not end users, i.e. those 
who will actually use the data at a computer or, increasingly, mobile phone. 
 
When the space engineering design and development models were defined, mobile 
platforms were not yet invented, and the business of getting an object into space so 
complex, risky and expensive, that strict boundaries had to be drawn around what 
constituted the space industry. Retiring risk is the chief focus of the systems 
engineering approach in the space industry. 
 
Figure 3.5 shows the relationship between user requirements (in this case termed 
‘expectations’) and an eventually designed EO system. This is an ideal model, and 
describes a system in which the customer and the end user appear to be coterminous. 
An engineer would see no problem with this model, and could locate it within the 
normal systems engineering framework. Engineers believe their method to be 
rational, and may not agree with the assertion by Lin and Silva (2005) that: 
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‘… the management of the adoption of information systems is a social and political 
process in which stakeholders frame and reframe their perceptions of such systems, 
and that social phenomena such as language, symbolic power, and communication 
processes should be seen as fundamental for understanding how these technological 
interpretations are framed’ (Lin & Silva 2005). 
 
Engineers who are not schooled in the social sciences may not concur with the notion 
that any systems engineering framework is the product of a social and political 
environment. Most engineers would however agree with the observations of  
Alenljung and Persson (2008), that requirements engineering is not a science and 
inherent in it are:  ‘ill-structured problems, uncertain, dynamic environments, shifting, 
ill-defined, or competing goals or values, ambiguity of information, interpretation of 
the history of decisions’, and to add to this list they identify time stress, high stakes, 
multiple player situations, and organisational goals and norms. (Alenljung & Persson 
2008). 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Schematic representation of the process involved in converting users' 
expectation into measurement requirements (Verstraete et al. 2015). 
 
Requirements are not elicited in a politically neutral environment. What many 
researchers are saying is that requirements engineering is highly contingent. It takes 
  50 
3	  
place within a specific socioeconomic, historic and political context. In particular, as 
Milne & Maiden (2012) point out, ‘power and politics have necessarily become 
increasingly relevant factors, but that they have not yet been given adequate 
consideration.’ In satellite engineering, it takes place within the norms and practices 
of a space industry whose focus is designing and constructing space technology, not 
creating end user applications. Others go further, attacking the very philosophical 
underpinning of requirements elicitation (Ralph 2013). 
 
Verstraete et al. (2015) would agree with this, exhorting the panoply of different 
specialists within the space mission design chain to communicate with each other and 
not lose sight of customer expectations. He underscores the importance of user 
requirements in this chain:  
‘Failure to collect or misinterpreting user requirements will lead to a 
perception of an overarching technology push, which may be resented or 
rejected by the government or the funding agency; while minimal involvement 
from industry or suppressed inputs from the scientific community will 
inevitably lead to the definition of a run-of-the-mill, uninspiring, solution that 
duplicates existing capabilities and therefore may not even be useful.’ 
(Verstraete et al. 2015). 
 
Why Verstraete et al., seasoned professionals in the space industry, feel the need to 
state this is interesting and pertinent to the argument presented here. Since the 
traditional systems engineering method employed in the space industry places 
requirements at the start, and all technical specifications flow from this, what could be 
the problem? It is worthwhile examining the practices of the adjacent computer 
industry. If we see satellites as computers within an Information Systems (IS) value 
chain, there may be some interesting similarities between these industries. 
3.6 Enterprise	  architectures	  and	  the	  user	  concept	  
Bridging engineering and the business and software worlds are Enterprise 
Architectures. These arose out of business systems planning as early as the 1970s, 
though Zachmann is often credited with having kick-started the topic with his 
Zachmann Framework tool in 1987.  
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Some Enterprise Architecture frameworks were devised for space engineering, 
including one of the more popular enterprise architectures today: TOGAF, The Open 
Group Architecture Framework. Although TOGAF was initiated in the 1990s, its 
origins lie in the Technical Architecture Framework for Information Management. 
TAFIM was developed from 1986 until 1999 by the US Department of Defense 
(DoD), and in parallel in 1994, the DoD started the development of the C4ISR 
Architecture Framework. This in turn evolved into the Department of Defense 
Architecture Framework (DoDAF).  
 
One of the key features of TOGAF is its cyclicity. Although there are blocks of 
activities identified within the TOGAF framework, in fact it is legitimate to take up 
work at any point in the cycle. For this reason, the standard image of high-level 
TOGAF architecture development is of a series of circles in a daisy formation, with 
Requirements Management as central to all activities (see Figure 3.6). 
 
The enterprise is itself not necessarily one company, or even an industry model such 
as will be familiar to those working in EO. It is, as defined by the standard TOGAF 9: 
‘The highest level (typically) of description of an organization and typically covers all 
missions and functions. An enterprise will often span multiple organizations.’ (Josey 
2011). The enterprise value chain ends at the end user, and therefore naturally 
encompasses end user applications or programs which arise as a result of any project. 
The TOGAF Framework is not a tool brought in to manage a specific time-bounded 
project, such as a space mission, but is a blueprint for sustainability for an 
organisation. 
 
Requirements Management as a block of activities is weakly described in TOGAF. Its 
defining feature is that there is no concept of a static set of requirements ‘…but a 
dynamic process whereby requirements for enterprise architecture and subsequent 
changes to those requirements are identified, stored, and fed into and out of the 
relevant ADM phases, and also between cycles of the ADM’ (TOGAF Version 9.1). 
The ADM is the Architecture Development Method, which is the core of TOGAF and 
shown in Figure 3.6. 
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Requirements are ever-changing because the environment is dynamic: ‘architecture 
often deals with drivers and constraints, many of which by their very nature are 
beyond the control of the enterprise’ (TOGAF Version 9.1). Therefore the entire cycle 
of activities is predicated on a changing set of requirements. Creating objects in this 
milieu, to engineers who need to get around to a Bill Of Materials at some point, 
would appear to be implausible. However the ADM has been created in order to allow 
the architects to create complex abstract entities which only at the last moment 
become concrete solutions. This large disjuncture between design and physical object 
characterizes large-scale architecture undertakings in the business and software world. 
 
Figure 3.6: Architecture Development Method (TOGAF Version 9.1). 
 
The Requirements Management process does not concern itself with how 
requirements are managed. It does not deal with their creation, disposal, or 
prioritisation. Requirements are simply held in a Requirements Repository and 
variously selected for the different stages of the ADM. As would be expected with 
any engineering undertaking, both functional and non-functional requirements are 
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applicable, but in addition to the requirements themselves are the environments in 
which those requirements play out. The architect must take account of the 
requirement’s assumptions, constraints, domain-specific principles, policies, 
standards, organisation guidelines and other specification norms.  
 
TOGAF further doesn’t supply any processes or tools for requirements management, 
simply stating what an effective requirements management process should achieve. 
As TOGAF 9.1 states, the field of Requirements Engineering provides plenty of 
advice in the specifics of requirements themselves, and TOGAF doesn’t see the need 
to interfere.  
 
One of the guiding Application Principles in TOGAF (Principle 16) is Technology 
Independence. Technology is subject to continual obsolescence and vendor 
dependence. These must not become the drivers over user requirements. Engineers on 
the other hand are trained in technologies and their designs are very often driven by 
what technology is available, and, in space, has flight heritage. This is one way in 
which TOGAF would be difficult to apply to many space missions unless this 
principle were deliberately disregarded. However the main thrust of the TOGAF 
approach is to create architecture designs which are distant from solutions and 
technologies. This indirection is vital to the success of applying architecture 
frameworks. 
 
Over the past two decades, the US space industry has had to adopt The Department of 
Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) as its architecture methodology. This is 
presented in its most procedural and simple form in Figure 3.7, where technologies, 
particularly data technologies, are early targets for analysis. The chief criticism of 
DODAF and many architecture frameworks is their heavy-handedness. Weighty 
volumes describe their processes and approaches which require several training 
courses and changes to established business processes within organisations to adopt. 
In the meantime, while large organisations are getting to grips with architecture 
frameworks, disruptive technologies are poised to steal their thunder. 
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Figure 3.7: DODAF 6-stage architecture process Department of Defense 
Architecture Framework Version 2.02. 
 
It is worth mentioning lighter-weight architectural approaches designed for software 
development, which take ideas from systems engineering and apply them more 
appropriately and with a far less time and cost overhead. The Software Engineering 
Institute (SEI) is a sound repository and generator of these software-oriented 
approaches. 
 
The SEI’s ATAM (Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method) and ADD (Attribute 
Driven Design) both attempt to isolate what is germane to software development 
projects, and focus on tools and techniques to assist the architect in devising and 
communicating their work. They emphasise iteration and re-use, and designing not 
according to requirements per se but attributes.  
 
The ADD method is for software-intensive projects, and deals specifically with these 
challenges: 
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§ How do you design the architecture for a system so that it best meets users' 
needs? 
§ How do you meet quality attribute requirements for envisioned systems? 
§ How do you determine which architectural strategies are appropriate for your 
quality attribute requirements? 
§ How can you understand the impact of quality attribute tradeoffs while you're 
designing a software architecture? 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/architecture/tools/define/add.cfm 
 
In Attribute Driven Design, the key tool is workshops that elicit what Quality 
Attributes are required by a given architecture. These attributes can be ranked and the 
chosen architectures analysed against them, or created for them.  
 
The Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method shown in Figure 3.8 is a technique for 
comparing architectures and their fit to attribute-driven goals. Several different 
architectures are normally proposed according to the agendas of different 
stakeholders. The ATAM provides a way of comparing these according to an agreed 
set of attributes. 
 
Figure 3.8: A conceptual flow of the Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method Software 
Engineering Institute. (www.sei.cmu.edu). 
 
The question is whether these very different approaches to architecture and design 
incorporate the user in different ways, or allow for a different user concept, and how 
do they fit with systems engineering in a satellite design project? Although some of 
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the design concepts in software architecture may be very familiar to engineering, 
there are also some important points of divergence. 
 
In their general approach to architecture, the SEI states that it is not necessary to 
produce comprehensive documentation and diagrams to cover every stage. They are 
moving away from two major entrenched engineering notions: that of hierarchical 
levels, and the idea that everything must be documented. Engineers used to regarding 
all design as situated in a hierarchy often have difficulties with software development 
for these reasons.  
 
The SEI states that it is only necessary to produce those views that are necessary for a 
particular purpose (Clements et al. 2010). Engineering tools (such as the widely used 
CORE system) typically generate comprehensive diagrams covering every aspect of a 
design. Specific diagrams or views can be generated from an all-encompassing master 
repository containing all items, functions, interfaces, requirements, products and all 
other engineering artefacts. This is not the approach taken for much software 
development, where ‘levels’ are often disregarded in favour of objects relating to 
features, and only a small subset of the design is documented. 
 
What is emerging from this analysis is that architecture frameworks and design 
methods are chosen to fit the task at hand. Traditional satellite engineering entails a 
great many actors and stakeholders in the space value chain, and a complex 
architecture framework is required to characterise the whole enterprise. Although 
software engineering, or the creation of large-scale software programs to perform a 
variety of complex tasks, may also entail many actors, the core algorithms will be 
developed by a few individuals.  
 
A satellite project is, in fact, a one-off undertaking. It is a mission with a linear 
trajectory, requiring a particular approach to design and construction. Space also 
presents certain physical constraints, and a sizeable portion of a space project involves 
hardware, which unlike software is inflexible, and where decisions regarding 
hardware characteristics must be taken fairly early in the design cycle. Architecture 
frameworks designed for business and information systems can be essentially cyclic, 
sustainable, and contain many re-usable components. These approaches are not 
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mutually exclusive, and neither precludes a particular treatment of the user. What is 
more germane is that the space industry operates within a particular paradigm and set 
of expected outcomes, ontologies, and practices, and that these have not changed for 
many years. As shown with reference to the standards and reference models used by 
the space industry, these do not treat the user in any sophisticated way, and user 
requirements are one set of requirements among many others and not paramount in 
terms of the perceived success of a mission. Plus, as the space industry further 
commercialises and moves out of the influence of government, different models and 
modi operandi are possible. 
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4 Disruptive technologies 
Because the space industry, like many others, operates within its own confines, is 
risk-averse, slow to change, and not traditionally driven by consumer markets, the 
cycle of disruptive technology innovation has not featured as part of normal 
technological change management processes in the industry. By contrast, in the IT 
industry major disruptions in the relationship between technology and markets are 
commonplace. Disruptive technologies are interesting to explore in terms of 
developing countries, since they represent new approaches that do not rely on 
entrenched modi operandi. Just as mobile telephony could ‘leapfrog’ landline-based 
telephony and gain serious purchase in developing countries, where the fastest market 
penetration was witnessed (United Nations 2009), so too there is potential for new 
disruptive space technologies to be adopted by space industries and agencies outside 
of the developed world.   
 
While conservative in nature, the military is aware of the effects of disruptive 
innovations, as illustrated in the following quote from a 2012 military report: 
Disruptive change is not a new phenomenon. New technologies, unexpected 
threats, novel tactics and techniques, and altered approaches can create 
changes to the strategic environment in which we operate. Those changes can 
alter the landscape in ways that, if not addressed, can dramatically upset the 
existing order. They can render effective strategies impotent, change winners 
into losers, and turn victory into defeat. (Pawlikowski 2012) 
 
Pawlikowski cites the common example of disruptive change in the music recording 
industry with the introduction of digital music in 1982, pointing out that the disruptive 
force can take a long time to play out, and that such disruption is not necessarily 
deleterious for the industry being disrupted. It can be, and in her example has, left 
‘many big music labels grasping for how to cope with the threat.’ 
 
Disruptive technologies arise to challenge an industry status quo, overturning 
established cant, and addressing a need in a better way. This new way can upset 
existing power structures. As remarked by Kostoff et al (2004): ‘Disruptive 
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technologies create growth in the industries they penetrate or create entirely new 
industries through the introduction of products and services that are dramatically 
cheaper, better, and more convenient.’ They introduce both threats (to established 
industry) and opportunity (for newcomers, and eventually for some established 
organisations). Disruptive technology theory however cannot be applied to every 
industrial sector in the same way, as there are important differences. 
 
In a normal competitive environment characterised by increasing technological 
complexity, the progress and adoption of new technologies, and the entire business of 
innovation does not follow a linear pattern. Technologies are adopted not according to 
what is expedient, rational, or cost-effective but along a complex and messy 
relationship between society and technology, politics and marketing. At its most 
sterile, the introduction and success of disruptive technologies follows a model akin to 
Marxist dialectics, or more appropriate for technology and science, a Khunian 
structure of scientific revolution. Those technologies which are now dominant and 
promoted by established organisations become overturned by an innovative 
newcomer which threatens and destabilises the organisational, market, and technical 
status quo. This in turn becomes the established leader. 
 
A working definition proffered by van der Veen et al is: 
‘A disruptive technology is a technology that alters the status quo of both the 
market position of the dominant technology and the competitive market layout 
by having an alternative perceived performance mix, which is valued more by 
the customer than the one of the dominant technology’ (van der Veen et al. 
2012). 
 
A key commentator and researcher on disruptive innovation is Prof C M Christensen 
who, along with others, has identified sustainability as being a vital factor in assessing 
its trajectory, mechanics and impact. Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between new 
entrants and incumbents, and crucially that the trajectory of technological progress 
outstrips the ability of customers to take up those improvements. Markets and 
customers’ ability to take up new technology lag behind the technologies foisted onto 
them by the space industry. 
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Figure 4.1: The constructs of performance trajectories and the classification of 
sustaining and disruptive innovations (Christensen 2006). 
 
There is a second type of disruption which can occur, called ‘low-end disruption’, 
where a niche technology can come to serve a mass market, and thus becomes itself a 
mainstream technology, as described by Christensen, Anthony, and Roth (2004) 
quoted in (van der Veen et al. 2012).  Both of these are prevalent in the space industry 
and have implications for developing countries and their relationship with space 
technology. These modes of disruption also have an interesting relationship to the 
user, who becomes a more central driver of change in a disruptive model. 
4.1 Comparison	   of	   disruptive	   technologies	   in	   the	   space	   and	   IT	  
Industries	  
The space industry began to be aware of the encroachment of disruptive technologies 
more than twenty years ago. At that time, the environment of space engineering was 
characterised by a bloated and unsustainable status quo, explained by Maj Gen 
Thomas Taverney: ‘with the Space Acquisition Vicious Circle, our space systems 
become more and more complex and expensive, with no room for failure.’ Figure 4.2 
shows how one feature exacerbates the next, resulting in tardy and very expensive 
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satellites in increasingly fragile constellations. Although he was concerned with 
satellites for military purposes, the same holds true for non-military functions. 
  
Figure 4.2: Resilient, disaggregated, and mixed constellations (Taverney 2011). 
 
In addition to a complex and expensive design and development cycle, two other 
characteristics of space made it ripe for disruption: risk aversion, and a lowering of 
barriers to entry. In Earth Observation for example, customer needs and technical 
performance are both trending towards higher spatial resolution and shorter revisit 
time imagery (Denis et al. 2016), and both can be supplied by a variety of providers 
who do not belong in or arise from the traditional space industry. The reason other 
providers have joined this market is because they are able to undermine or bypass 
space industry norms. These facets will be explored further below.  
 
Space and satellite technologies and how they face disruption are not identical to the 
IT world, where disruption has been a commonplace feature, and where companies 
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seek to disrupt themselves in a normal cycle of constant competitive inventiveness. A 
typical story about Steve Jobs goes that, when introducing the iPhone to the Board of 
Directors at Apple Inc., he was criticised as the iPhone could potentially supplant the 
highly successful iPod. His retort was that overturning their own product markets was 
exactly what they should be doing.  
 
It is more normal for disruptive technologies to be introduced by outsiders, and for 
there to be an initial period of market scepticism prior to their exponential rise. 
Theories of disruptive innovation have one common feature: that of a sudden takeover 
of a technology which supplants existing solutions. Most theories take their data from 
the digital world, and since space technologies are frequently digital, this is a further 
reason they have been subjected to disruption in recent decades.  
 
A significant difference is that space is one of the global commons along with sea and 
cyberspace, and these have strategic significance. Therefore there are reasons for 
governments to take an interest besides the military applications afforded by space. 
Cebrowski and Raymond (2005) point out that space, sea, and cyberspace constitute a 
‘triad of capabilities on which America’s global power rests’. They see ‘falling 
barriers to competitive entry and increasing technical vulnerabilities in space systems, 
coupled with increasing dependency on space capabilities’ as heralding a need to 
refresh business models with respect to space technologies: 
‘While the cost to place a kilogram of capability on orbit remains expensive, 
the capability resident in every kilogram is soaring, given the unrelenting 
increase in information technology’ (Cebrowski & Raymond 2005). 
 
As space technologies move increasingly into the commercial realm, governments too 
must refresh their ideas about how to construct and operate the objects they send into 
space. Here lies a complicated relationship between cost, capability and risk which 
stresses the traditional structures of the space industry, further exposing it to 
disruption. 
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4.2 Complexity,	  risk,	  and	  cost:	  fractionated	  architectures	  
A solution to risk in space engineering is to introduce redundancy, such as parallel 
systems for mission-critical components, and to insist on flight heritage. Both these 
responses can increase cost, development schedule, and therefore increase market risk 
as well as, paradoxically, increase complexity and thereby technical risk. As 
Eremenko and Hamilton point out: 
‘The current approach – or lack thereof – to designing space systems for 
robustness to uncertainty is the key to the sharply escalating costs and 
development timelines facing the space industry. Consider, for instance, the 
typical status quo approach to making a spacecraft robust to technical or 
environmental risk. The solution is adding margins or parallel redundant 
component strands in mission-critical areas. This addition of components, in 
turn, increases system complexity. As complexity grows, so does the system 
size, cost, and schedule’ (Eremenko & Hamilton 2008). 
 
This introduces a ‘cost-complexity death spiral’, and approaches to address this in the 
space and aerospace industries have been to opt for adding capabilities to satellites, 
making them more attractive, but also increasing complexity and fragility. The 
reasons for this, postulate Eremenko & Hamilton, are to do with organisational inertia 
or aversion to bearing the risk associated with process changes (Eremenko & 
Hamilton 2008). 
 
Their proposed solution to the death spiral is to create a ‘fractionated space industry’. 
What this means in practice is that different organisations deliver modules or 
components that can be increased or decreased in number as the need arises. A 
spacecraft’s exact capabilities do not need to be designed ab initio but can be 
manipulated closer to launch. Fractionated architectures bring flexibility to adapt to 
changed circumstances in demand. The closer to market delivery a satellite’s output 
is, the lower the risk that it will not deliver in accordance with demand, 
 
This rule may hold true for many applications, but the usual market forces do not 
always apply with satellite data and satellite applications. Nobody demanded Uber, 
for example. Herein lies a similarity with the IT industry and a glimpse into the 
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rationale behind ‘user-disdain’. Users, particularly end users, are insufficiently 
technically proficient to make demands on these industries. Therefore the normal 
economic rules of supply and demand do not apply. Products with a highly technical 
basis are driven by ‘technology push’ scenarios, where the drivers for product 
development are technological innovation and not market demand. 
 
However, Eremenko and Hamilton are arguing for a modularised space industry and 
satellite design as opposed to the few large organisations that have tended to dominate 
particularly the large satellite market. They point out the analogy with the IT industry, 
where corporations producing monolithic mainframes became obsolete. They are not 
quite correct in this, particularly now with the advent of Big Data requiring High-
Performance Computing. The term ‘mainframe’ may have slipped from popular use, 
but large computing facilities are re-emerging given the requirement for massive 
processing and storage capacity. Plus, after an initial shaking out, some large actors, 
such as IBM and Hewlett-Packard, have persisted. This does not diminish the impact 
of disruptive technologies, and those large companies that have persisted through 
many cycles of innovative disruption have had to adapt to constantly changing market 
demands. 
 
Time delays introduce their own inherent risks, as Pawlikowski (2012) describes:  
‘…spacecraft planned for construction in the next decade are still using 
computer processing technology from the late 1990s when they were 
designed. For example, some billion dollar satellites launching in 2020 will 
have missed over 24 years of capability increases driven by Moore’s law, or 
roughly 16 cycles of processing power increases’. 
 
Retired engineers need to be consulted regarding obsolescent systems they had been 
working on, but which have ‘flight heritage’ and are therefore considered low risk, 
and still being commissioned for space missions. Although it is the case that repairing 
machinery in space is almost impossible, and that mistakes can result in catastrophic 
failure, it is also, in the terrestrial realm, highly risky to unleash new technology on 
the public which is replicated millions of times.  The Samsung Galaxy Note 7 debacle 
in 2016 is a case in point, where batteries overheated and sometimes conflagrated, 
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requiring a recall of 2.5 million units with a significant dent in reputation (CNN 
website, 2017). The risk of this type of failure does not inhibit Samsung’s IT industry 
from innovating both in terms of its products and processes. 
 
As Pawlikowski remarks, the space industry may adopt new technologies from time 
to time, but its underlying methods and design processes remain static: 
‘The uses, importance, industrial base, cost dynamics, complexity, and 
competitiveness of space have all fundamentally changed from where we 
began; but the trajectory of system architectures did not change with them—
rather, they continued on their original path’ (Pawlikowski 2012). 
 
Five years ago it was pointed out that the space sector had not yet been 
‘commercialised’ and that if more were invested in disruptive technologies, there 
would be a flowering of more commercial space offerings in the fields of ‘… earth 
observation, telecommunication & navigation while possibly opening it up to new 
ventures such as space tourism, space based solar power and asteroid mining’ as this 
commercialisation would result in higher performance and lower prices (van der Veen 
et al. 2012). 
4.3 Technology	  and	  regulatory	  barriers	  to	  entry	  
Cost and strategic/military barriers to entry have maintained strong boundaries around 
the tasks of the aerospace and defence industries. Underpinning space mission design 
for some space agencies and governments are protectionism and control, as seen with 
the example of ITAR restrictions. Launch and infrastructure costs remain high. These 
are factors which have begun to be eroded to some extent, with the advent of cheaper 
and expendable CubeSats.  
 
Planet are, at the time of writing, busy disrupting the EO market sector. In February 
2017 they launched a swarm of 88 small satellites each with a mass of around 4kg, on 
a single rocket. On their webpage whose title is ‘Agile Aerospace’ they state:  
‘Planet is designing, building and launching satellites faster than any company 
or government in history. We use commodity consumer electronics to build 
highly capable satellites at drastically lower costs. With the most advanced 
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satellites launching into orbit every 3-4 months, our capabilities are on the 
cutting edge and always advancing’ (Planet website, 2017). 
 
This is not a one-off endeavour by a small company, but linked to Google’s long-term 
strategy. Google sold its satellite company, Terra Bella to Planet in early 2017, and 
entered into a multi-year contract to allow Google Earth access to Planet imagery. 
Terra Bella was formed following Google’s purchase of Skybox Imaging for $500 
million in 2014.  
 
SpaceX plans to launch 4,425 satellites to provide Internet connectivity to the entire 
world. Samsung and Boeing also have similar plans to launch thousands of small 
satellites. These may be relatively expendable and offer relatively low resolution, but 
their characteristics have been driven by market analysis, and entailed jettisoning the 
normal low-risk high-tech approach of space engineering. 
 
An analogy exists with the IT industry, where in the early days up to the 1980s, 
computers were large, very expensive, technically difficult and the province of 
institutions that held specific data requirements. The advent of ever cheaper and more 
powerful personal computers saw an explosion of applications, especially after 
technological inhibitors were reduced, with more user-friendly and affordable 
development environments, the Internet and so on. Specialist knowledge, gatekeepers, 
and technologies became increasingly accessible to the general public and 
entrepreneurs, who took advantage. Whether newcomers can sustainably attack 
traditional space actors and established business models, and whether disruptive 
technologies are merely smaller, faster, cheaper is discussed below. 
4.4 ‘NewSpace’	  business	  models	  
Along with many commentators on disruptive technologies, Cebrowski & Raymond 
quote Professor Clayton Christensen’s Disruptive Innovation Model, describing a 
‘new value network’ as being created by smaller satellites (Cebrowski & Raymond 
2005). Small satellites, in particular CubeSats and nanosats are typically associated 
with disruptive technologies in space, or as it is often called ‘NewSpace’. Its early 
moniker, reflecting a naming convention in the Unix operating system, was ‘alt.space’ 
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(alternative space), ‘alt.*’ being the prefix for newsgroups self-classified as 
‘alternative’, often in a political sense. Small satellites are cheaper and faster to 
develop and are being thought of as expendable market-driven platforms. 
 
What is alternative about the EO business models of the past seven or eight years is 
that they have emerged from the military and government sector into commercial and 
private domains. This is for several reasons, all contributing to recent and ongoing 
major disruption in the field. The new value network lies in the creation of a mass 
market for space-acquired data both in remote sensing and navigation. 
 
Increased performance of commercial satellites has a high degree of convergence with 
defence needs (25-30cm resolution being the current benchmark). Until recently, this 
performance was only affordable for governments and large established entities. The 
disruptive NewSpace trend in EO involves a model of start-ups and big web actors 
(e.g. Skybox and Google) with massive investment capacity, mirroring the rise of 
Silicon Valley in the 1980s, and often located there. International newcomers, 
investing in their own EO capacity, have joined the big established actors, opening up 
new opportunities for international or regional cooperation which may bypass the 
established industries and governments entirely. In parallel, development of the 
Internet has increased mass-market interest in geo-information. This context was 
favourable for cross-fertilizing space EO imagery with the digital economy, paving 
the way to new businesses and services (Denis et al. 2016).  
4.5 Sustainable	  space	  markets	  for	  EO	  data	  
As pointed out by Denis (2016), Moore’s law cannot obtain in low Earth orbit. 
Moore’s law is often quoted in the IT industry, whereby the density of integrated 
circuits doubles every two years. The exigencies of gravity, Kepler’s law and 
Rayleigh’s criteria mean that a non-geostationary object in space cannot fly at low 
altitude and stay there without expending energy, and cannot stay overhead in a 
stationery position. This caps the revisit time for a satellite. On top of that, the 
resolution of any imaging system is limited by diffraction: for a given wavelength, the 
angular resolution is inversely proportional to the aperture of the instrument (Denis et 
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al. 2016). A large imager which can take high resolution pictures needs a large 
satellite, as shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
Although the mass of imagers has decreased and new technologies on the drawing 
board promise even more lightweight imaging capabilities, for now an expensive 
constellation of satellites is needed for any comprehensive EO programme, which 
requires an extensive ground station network to service it. This infrastructure is non-
trivial and requires significant investment, which is out of the question for a start-up. 
Partnerships in this field are mandatory. There are technical barriers concerning 
payload size, if the trends continue with demand for spatial and temporal resolution 
continuing to rise. A new project by Airbus is addressing this demand in an 
innovative way, and this is mentioned below. 
 
A sustainable market implies ongoing profits, and as in the early days of the dot com 
boom, new entrants to the space arena are not yet profitable. At some point investors 
pull out, according to classical business cycle dynamics, leaving a few successful 
companies to become the dominant leaders. As with the IT industry, most start-ups do 
not succeed sustainably. However, while they encroach traditional markets with their 
innovations, they disrupt and bring changes which, as we will discuss in Chapter 5, 
may hold benefits for developing countries. 
  
 
Figure 4.3: New space with old physics. (Denis et al. 2016). 
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Remote sensing is not yet a profitable endeavour. The European Space Agency has 
decided to operate Sentinel satellites and provide their data as a public good because 
they could not find a significant commercial market for their imagery. By all accounts 
mass utilisation of commercial remote sensing data remains a relatively new 
enterprise, with rapidly changing technology offerings and marketplaces. 
4.6 Current	  disruptors	  
Disruption in the space sector is not all about small satellites. As far back as 2004, 
student-built spacecraft projects had been popular already for 10 years. Their main 
outcomes were training and access to space for university researchers. However 
university satellites have not disrupted industry practice in favour of small spacecraft 
(Swartwout 2004). As he points out, with a few exceptions, university-built spacecraft 
have been low cost, low capability and marginal performance vehicles. Furthermore 
the academic calendar forces missions into being of short duration. The tremendous 
reduction in component cost means that universities can indulge in high-risk, high-
reward missions, because of their great tolerance for failure. Therefore universities 
can regard spacecraft as disposable. This is not a sustainable model for business.  
 
The high visibility and prevalence of nanosat missions (between 1 and 10kg mass), 
both from the university sector and some major and highly publicised disruptors such 
as Planet and SpaceX, has meant that often these missions are thought of as 
coterminous with disruptive innovation. There are a few other technologies worth 
mentioning which are also disruptive to the status quo. 
 
SpaceDatahighway is the name for a project launched by Airbus: an ‘innovative inter-
satellite laser communication technology on-board the lower orbiting satellites or the 
aircrafts and on the geostationary satellites that are permanently in view of 
(European) ground stations.’ (Airbus Defence and Space website, 2017). The 
implications of this technology are near-real time EO video, and ‘radio-silent’ 
operations for increased stealth and security for European institutions. This ultra-
broadband technology eliminates data latency, has a data rate of 1.8 gbps, and can 
transmit 40 terabytes per day. This does not deploy nano- or micro-satellites, but 
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combines technologies and large geostationary satellites to provide a potentially 
disruptive technology. Interestingly this is a technology push initiative, and Airbus is 
seeking applications for their technology. 
 
Aerostats are encroaching into EO territory by offering several capabilities 
unavailable to satellites, and at lower cost and risk. These tethered helium balloons 
can sustain continuous monitoring of land area with high resolution video. Weight is 
not as problematic as it is for satellites, and fibre optic cable running down the tether 
obviates the need for ground stations. Sophisticated aerostats can remain in place for a 
month without requiring maintenance, and once adjustments are made they can be 
easily released back to their monitoring position. Being situated beneath clouds 
increases their functional capability.  
 
Aircraft are expensive to operate, and drones are prone to failure and can only 
monitor a small swath. Nevertheless these alternatives to satellites for EO applications 
are being deployed and further explored in developing countries where satellite revisit 
times are relatively lengthy, and coverage relatively poor. High altitude systems 
which do not require launch into space are cheaper, less risky, more local and 
responsive to demand. As more of the world’s population moves into cities, this 
becomes a strategic problem for sales of EO imagery and satellites, as there are 
alternative vehicles to satellites that can be established closer to centres of population. 
 
Large satellites can also act as disruptors. High Throughput Satellites (HTS) which, as 
the name suggests provide high bandwidth and low latency, threaten geosynchronous 
satellite services. HTS satellites, launched in the last few years by several of the space 
industry giants (Eutelsat, Inmarsat and Intelsat amongst them) have fibre-like data 
rates, and can deliver 4G type services to remote rural locations, as long as they are 
located within 45 degrees of the equator. HTS satellites are costly, given the complex 
multi-beam payloads they are carrying, which enable them to re-use frequencies. 
These drive the cost up, and an extensive new ground infrastructure is needed to 
operate them. However, there is increasing demand for broadband IP services 
justifying the expense. These could prove more disruptive than LEO satellites. More 
work needs to be done to explore this area. 
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An interesting disruptor to the normal business model for satellite communications is 
discussed in Chapter 5, where satellite-enabled Internet access and cellular hotspots 
are provided by units attached to soft drink dispensing machines in developing 
country rural areas. This initiative is a partnership between Coca-Cola South Africa, 
local bottling partner Coca-Cola Fortune, and BT Global Services. 
4.7 Renting	  data	  
The traditional model for EO imagery is for customers to purchase images of 
increasing resolution for their specific purposes (disaster management, soil analysis, 
coastal erosion monitoring etc.). Many of these images are inserted into geospatial 
software applications, and customers are expected to have their own specialists who 
can manipulate this data. Recent changes show an increase in image rental, where 
customers do not need to download images but wish to have a glimpse at a solution 
within a vertical application. Many customers are not as interested in high spatial 
resolution as high revisit times, and their applications frequently need a mix of 
technologies to get around cloud cover. Their need is for information and solutions, 
not datasets. 
 
What customers are increasingly seeking is complex analysis where data has been 
sourced from a wide range of providers, locations, and types. These arise from 
synergistic technologies, where the sum of its whole is greater than the simple sum of 
its parts. 
4.8 Synergistic	  Technologies,	  Big	  Data,	  the	  Internet	  of	  Things	  
Social, Mobile, Analytics, Cloud (SMAC) relates to: 
 ‘an ecosystem that allows a business to improve its operations and get closer 
to the customer with minimal overhead and maximum reach. The proliferation 
of structured and unstructured data that is being created by mobile devices, 
sensors, social media, loyalty card programs and website browsing is creating 
new business models built upon customer-generated data.’ (Techtarget 
website, 2017). 
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Many customers of remote sensing data no longer wish to buy expensive images, but 
are looking for processed and analysed information embedded within a framework 
which addresses their need and speaks their language, in a format interoperable with 
other forms of data. This data originates from many sources as the term SMAC 
implies. With time, this data will be augmented by ‘the Internet of Things’ where a 
proliferation of devices includes sensors that send data via the Internet to data 
processing and analytics centres. The sheer amount of data anticipated requires (what 
in today’s terms is) High Performance Computing along with the current buzzword: 
Big Data.  
 
This is important for space technologies and remote sensing, not just because there 
will be an increase in Internet traffic when billions of new sensors become active, but 
because of the synergistic nature of data in the near future. Customers will seek 
information which incorporates SMAC data, and behind that will be the technologies 
of High Performance Computing, Big Data algorithms, as well as remote sensing data 
from space, and naturally additional telecommunications heft. New companies such 
as Orbital Insight and Dashboard are positioned to take advantage of data synergies, 
where satellite data is just one among many inputs to complex algorithm-driven 
solutions.  
 
Orbital Insight aims to ‘… transform images from space into actionable insights’, and 
their blog details end user solutions and applications (Orbital Insight website, May 
2017). Closer to home, the Digital Dome project launched at the Iziko Planetarium in 
Cape Town in May 2017 aims to capitalise on the need for EO data integration with 
other platforms to provide insight. This insight is for both academic and commercial 
purposes, and requires massive graphic and computing capability to render data sets 
for a 3-dimensional projector to provide an immersive data-rich experience. 
4.9 Technical	  debt	  
The central danger in having new industries join space is technical debt. Given the 
rapid cyclicity of the disruptive innovation model, technical debt can be found in 
many industries today, though the origins of the concept lie in software programming. 
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In the absence of a thorough technical grounding in a subject, newcomers may be 
capable of superficially entering a market with a new attractive product, but this new 
product is unsustainable in its environment. Given a thorough grounding in 
appropriate technologies, services and products developed by newcomers lack certain 
quality characteristics. 
 
For example in software development, the underlying code, although it may fulfil its 
functional aspects, is substandard: unsupportable, unmaintainable, lacking in 
interoperability or easy upgradability and so on. In short, quality attributes which a 
seasoned architect or developer would pay attention to are not necessarily paramount 
to a disrupter whose chief aim is to bring a new product to market as quickly as 
possible: ‘… aspects concerning end-of-lifecycle aspects, system durability, 
information security and sustainability are often considered as an afterthought or a 
low-priority requirement that can be sacrificed in the heat of the race towards 
deadlines’ (Christoph 2014). 
 
Analogous to money, if technical debt is not ‘repaid’ it can accumulate and accrue 
‘interest’, making it harder to repair or change later, and unaddressed technical debt 
causes software entropy. This is a situation analogous to entropy in closed systems 
following the second law of thermodynamics. As a system is modified, its disorder, or 
entropy, increases. This is why software patches can only maintain a system for a 
limited period, and at some point the entire system must be replaced, in a normal 
upgrade cycle. 
 
The satellite industry creates and relies increasingly on software, making this concept 
highly pertinent to space. To make matters more critical to the space industry, the 
long term sustainability attributes such as security, resilience and low failure rates are 
not only important but critical to the success of a mission. Therefore there is a tension 
in software for satellite missions between accumulating technical debt and obeying 
traditional engineering requirements for space systems.  
 
One response to this is to create re-usable Open Source systems. Open Source 
systems benefit from a greater number of developers and implementations, ironing 
out technical flaws with greater rapidity and therefore reducing risk. The government 
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sector has been and continues to be privacy and security oriented with respect to any 
technology relating to space. However, not all software connected to satellite missions 
resides in space, nor are all missions critical for national security.  
 
The Hummingbird monitoring and control framework for small satellites is a case in 
point. This is a system designed to monitor and control a ground station, but could 
equally be used to monitor and control a satellite at the same time. Modern control 
frameworks (such as TANGO) allow the decoupling of functions from the structure of 
code, unlike older functionally designed systems. This frees implementation to be 
more about configuration, lighter weight, and highly adaptable. 
 
The authors of the Hummingbird system point out that the risk-averse nature of the 
space domain has, unwittingly, increased technical debt. Because the space industry is 
reluctant to overhaul its software systems, they are now left with systems which have 
‘a large number of known bugs, requires esoteric knowledge to configure and 
stabilise, is overly complex and offers little in the way of modern interfaces’ (Doyle, 
M. and Klug 2012). The Hummingbird Open Source system shares much in common 
with modern software systems: it is modular, written using a Service-Oriented 
Architecture approach, and this makes it effortless to swap protocols and modules. By 
‘interfaces’ the authors are not referring to user interfaces but code interfaces, where a 
technical stack can be created to fulfil mission aims which includes a great deal of re-
usable and public domain code.  
 
The space industry, they say, is ‘entering a new age, driven by low-cost hardware and 
software solutions. These modern solutions are driven by practical considerations, 
focusing on integrating and adapting ‘off-the-shelf’ products in place of specialised 
solutions’ (Doyle, M. and Klug 2012). Since the requirement for longevity in space 
has fallen away for very small satellite projects, the question as to whether this new 
era of low-cost technology may be building up technical debt is moot. Certain sectors 
of the NewSpace domain may not care about longevity, and will sacrifice resilience 
for efficiency and short-term cost effectiveness. In any case, modern software systems 
are more robust than their forebears, and attempting to force compatibility with old 
systems by relying on clunky APIs and patches may entail greater risk. 
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Whether technical debt is a setback in the realms of disruptive innovation in the space 
industry remains unclear, and is a question outside of the scope of this study. It is a 
subject taken seriously in software development in the IT industry, but does not 
dominate software engineering in the space industry. In the space industry, software 
development (called ‘software engineering’, and usually following ECSS standards), 
concerns largely control and embedded systems and is not the same undertaking as 
software application development for a public marketplace.   
4.10 What	  has	  Disruptive	  Innovation	  got	  to	  do	  with	  the	  user?	  
One of the characteristics of disruptive technologies that engenders their success is 
that they give people what they want better (cheaper, faster) than the current offerings 
in a particular domain.  They ‘challenge industry incumbents by offering simpler, 
good-enough alternatives to an underserved group of customers’ (Baumann et al. 
2006). If the disruptor’s offering is better suited to market needs, this raises the 
question as to whether they are more responsive to users themselves, and why. Is it 
the case that disruptors pay more attention to end users or is the technology push 
model as prevalent amongst disruptors as the established organisations? What makes 
the disruptors special, apart from their lack of investment in a particular set of 
process, practices and products? 
 
SPIRE is a relatively small new company in the space industry. Since it was 
established in 2012 through crowd funding it has successfully deployed 12 EO 
CubeSats into Low Earth orbit. However, it is, by its own description, not a satellite 
services provider, but a ‘data driven organization’ (Spire website, 2017) which is 
structured according to vertical data markets. Using data from nanosatellites it aims to 
‘improve human and machine behaviour’. The focus of this organisation is users and 
end user applications. Images of satellites themselves are not the mainstay of their 
branding, but rather what they can do with those images for specific markets. What 
these organisations have in common is data-centricity rather than space technology 
being central to their aims.  
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4.11 What	  has	  Disruptive	  Innovation	  got	  to	  do	  with	  Africa?	  
Disruptive technologies are relevant to a discussion about the orientation of space 
technologies for Africa in several ways. 
 
1) Developing countries can present novel markets.  
2) Barriers to entry with NewSpace technologies have relaxed and therefore 
allow organisations with less capitalisation to participate. 
3) The lack of an established industry means there is nothing to lose by being 
more technologically innovative, in terms of existing business processes and 
investment in modus operandi, development platforms, personal contact 
networks, contractual obligations with suppliers, and so on. 
4) There are no legacy systems to hold back the adoption of new technology. 
5) There is an increasing workforce of educated young people, empowered by 
recent advances in e-learning and improvements in tertiary education in 
Africa, and greater mobility of this workforce in general.  
 
Due chiefly to lower barriers to entry, as well as shifts in geopolitics, developing 
countries have and continue to invest in EO capabilities. Brazil, India, China and 
South Korea are already active. South African companies are developing remote 
sensing satellites and South Africa has already initiated a modest space programme. 
Kenya and Nigeria have purchased satellites in recent years. Algeria, Egypt and Libya 
are also developing their national space capabilities. 
 
It is not so much the ability of African countries to join the space arena that is 
germane to a discussion on disruption, but that disruptive technologies are benefitting 
Africa in surprising ways. Some of these ways are explored in Chapter 5. 
4.12 Disruptive	  technologies	  and	  the	  space	  industry	  
To sum up, the traditional space industry is being thoroughly disrupted, and not only 
in the remote sensing domain, which has been the main focus of this study. Rocketry, 
ground stations and launches are all being challenged by new styles of capability that 
perform similar functions, and there are new entrants from different industries 
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challenging established players. The space industry is far removed from its end users, 
with a more complex and fractured value chain than most other industries. Disruptors 
have a different set of drivers and are able to address user, or at least market, needs 
more directly than established industry actors. Part of that ability is due to a different 
perspective on scope and business value propositions, and part is due to them being 
less risk-averse and therefore able to exploit cheaper technologies. 
 
What this discussion on disruptive technologies demonstrates is that it can affect the 
relationship between the space industry and markets. It can bring new business 
models to the fore, and allow new entrants, thus increasing competitiveness and 
lowering costs. However there is still a strong technology push. The sustainability of 
most of these new entrants is still questionable, but the size of markets they have 
opened heralds the potential for new and enduring business models and applications. 
 
  
  
 
 
79 
5	  
5 Implications of the space industry’s limited user 
concept for social and economic development in 
Africa 
5.1 Introduction	  
In December 1965 Unesco convened a meeting of experts in the development of 
space communication. The ensuing report paints a dichotomous picture. The world 
was on the brink of using satellites for mass communications and entertainment on an 
unprecedented scale, and the experts foresaw an either/or future: 
‘Satellite communication can reveal to us in a larger measure than ever before 
the greatest creative achievements of man, the greatest utterances in the field 
of poetry, drama and music. It can also in equally abundant measure flood our 
eyes and ears with the most unseemly trash for hours on end.’  
 
These prophetic words carried with them a warning that: 
‘Since space communication needs the whole world for its arena, confining its 
benefits to those nations only which can afford them at present is likely to 
widen still further the gulf between the advanced and advancing nations 
leading possibly to greater strife, discord and eventual chaos’ (UNESCO 
1968). 
 
Since these experts met in 1965 the economic gulf may have widened between the 
haves and have-nots, but socially and economically, and in many other ways, the 
world has become more connected, as well as wealthier on average. The participants 
at this conference could not have imagined the impact of mobile telephony and the 
Internet on social development, yet at the same time that they would have to wait 
almost 50 years before mass, affordable communications in developing countries truly 
arrived. Whilst there remains a wealth and technology gap between rich and poor 
nations, the poor nations are not the same as those who were lagging behind in 1965 
(although African countries continue to be the most poverty-stricken and unequal in 
wealth distribution). The differences within countries are greater than the differences 
among them (UNESCO and ISSC 2016). 
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This study focuses on the gap between end users and those designing satellites, which 
has brought about a limitation in the use and take up of space-derived data. 
Commercial satellites are launched to provide services largely for those who can pay 
for them, and therefore satellites actively providing services for Africa are relatively 
few, as are applications developed to suit the needs of the region. The ‘digital divide’ 
persists despite the availability of mass telecommunications globally. The gap 
between satellite programme designers and end users is, as we shall explore, greater 
in developing countries than in the rest of the world. 
 
In 1968, the report by Unesco: ‘Communication in the Space Age’ stated that 
consideration must be given to: 
‘… The kind of association required between the developed and developing 
countries in the technological progress of the satellite, including scientific and 
engineering research on it, its development, construction, launching and final 
utilization. Clearly, the developed nations would be called on to make 
considerable sacrifices for the good of the rest of mankind who need a strong 
and effective helping hand, for the developed countries almost exclusively 
own or control the resources for developments in space, while those who will 
benefit to by far the greatest degree are the developing countries’ (UNESCO 
1968).  
 
This still obtains 50 years later: satellite development, ground segment and launch 
capability are almost entirely in the control of developed nations, as are the 
applications that utilise the ensuing data. Technology migrates towards, or is imposed 
upon, contexts for which it was not originally developed. Questions about alternative 
contexts are not raised during the design, development and deployment phases of the 
vast majority of technology applications, throughout the value chain. Some 
applications have been developed specifically for Africa, and in these cases the end 
user is more likely to be a beneficiary than a commercial user, and these are 
considered below.  
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5.2 What	   are	   the	   differences	   between	   Africa	   versus	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  
world?	  
To address the central question of this chapter, we need to identify the differences 
between Africa and the rest of the world in terms that are germane to space 
technologies and applications. We need to understand the geographic, political, 
economic and social factors that would give rise to differences in how space data may 
be taken up between African countries and the rest of the world.  
 
The principal difference is economic: African countries are poorer, collectively, than 
other regions. Most of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are in Africa 
(UNCTAD 2016). Space technology is expensive, and using the applications derived 
from space technologies requires a piece of technology at least as sophisticated as a 
cell phone or computer, preferably connected to the Internet, and these remain 
economically out of reach for many of the world’s poorest (United Nations 2009).  
 
Economics isn’t the only factor: digital literacy is much discussed in the topic of the 
‘digital divide’ which has been the focus of a great deal of research since the 
phenomenon was identified and the term coined in the 1990s. Culture, working 
practices and local perceived need for digital services also play a part in maintaining 
digital separation between developed and developing countries. 
 
The digital divide is important to address because, as Fuchs and Horak point out:  
‘The issue of global inequality is connected to the topic of the digital divide 
because technology is one aspect of material wealth and wealth production is 
more and more based on technology and knowledge. Africa is of particular 
importance here because it is the most marginalized and excluded region of 
the world’(Fuchs & Horak 2008). 
 
African nations themselves perceive this significance: 
‘In times past, we searched for gold, precious stones, minerals, and ore. 
Today, it is knowledge that makes us rich and access to information is all-
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powerful in enabling individual and collective success. (Lesotho Ministry of 
Communications, Science and Technology, 2005). 
 
As was identified by researchers decades ago, to be excluded from the digital domain 
is to be disenfranchised from a major part of modern economic life. In 2003, van 
Dijk, a well-known commentator on the digital divide, called this a usage gap rather 
than a knowledge gap, where participation in digital life is predicated on differential 
practical use and position in society, rather than knowledge alone (van Dijk & Hacker 
2003). This is borne out by more recent research in sub-Saharan Africa discussed 
below, where class identification and social networks foster a culture of overt 
knowledge acquisition (academic qualifications) without a concomitant (and often 
assumed) contribution to a country’s economy.  
 
Fuchs & Horak (2008) go further to speak of ‘digital apartheid’ which ‘means that 
certain groups and regions of the world are systematically excluded from cyberspace 
and the benefits that it can create’. Van Dijk (2006) speaks of a tripartite Marxian 
class structure, which is interesting to think about when considering technologies that 
may be appropriate for development. These classes are: 
1. The Information Elite consists of people with high levels of education and 
income, the best jobs and societal positions, and a nearly 100% access to 
ICTs.  
2. The Participating Majority which contains a large part of the middle class 
and the working class who do have access to computers and the Internet, but 
also possess fewer digital skills than the elite, information and strategic skills 
in particular, and use fewer and less diverse ICT applications.  
3. The Disconnected and Excluded who are largely excluded from 
participation in several fields of society and have no access to computers and 
the Internet.  (Van Dijk, 2006, quoted in Fuchs & Horak 2008). 
 
This schema is particularly applicable given the gross inequalities that exist within 
African countries, and which typically follow rural-urban lines. ICTs for development 
address the third class of citizen: the ‘Disconnected and Excluded’, whereas the 
‘Information Elite’ exist in a technological environment similar to those in many 
cities in the ‘global north’. (The terms ‘global north’ and ‘global south’ are common 
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in economic development and used as shorthand expressions for developed and 
developing respectively; the term ‘Western’ having become a politically contentious 
expression).  
 
Although economic education organisations such as Gapminder remind us that, in 
general, economic indicators for all nations continue to improve, the gap between rich 
and poor widens both within each country and between countries 
(www.gapminder.org). The average Gini index for sub-saharan Africa is one of the 
world’s highest, and high inequality is ‘divisive and socially corrosive’ as remarked 
by Wilkinson and Picket, (2010), quoted in the UNESCO World Social Science 
Report, 2016 (UNESCO and ISSC 2016). This report shows that South Africa has 
been at the top of the charts for wealth inequality since 1994, when income and 
wealth indices began to worsen. Countries in Africa with the highest wealth Gini 
index are the mining or oil-producing countries: Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria, South 
Africa. Within-country indicators vary widely by gender and location (rural/urban) 
and this has ramifications for the take-up of technology-based applications. Therefore 
any sensible comparison of African countries with those in the rest of the world must 
bear in mind that the differences within countries are greater than the differences 
between them and that this is more pronounced in Africa than in other continents.  
 
Figure 5.1 shows the penetration of Internet access comparing Africa to the rest of the 
world. Whilst Internet usage in Africa grew by 7.9% from 2000  - 2017, penetration 
as a percentage of population is 28.3%.  The average world Internet penetration is 
49.7%, with Europe and North America standing at 77.4% and 88.1%, respectively. 
The vast majority of African Internet access growth follows the rapid urbanisation of 
Africa in the previous decade (internetworldstats.com). 
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Figure 5.1:  Internet Penetration in Africa ( internetworldstats.com). 
 
The model of a PC connected to the Internet prevalent in the ‘global north’ was too 
costly to be sustainable or scalable (Heeks 2008). Mobile platforms are used to access 
the Internet in the LDCs.  
 
As far back as 8 years ago, mobile telephony reached more than half of Africa’s 
population. Data from 2016 shows that just over 25% of people in Africa use the 
Internet, with mobile broadband subscriptions at 29.3 per 100 inhabitants (ITU 2016). 
From 2010-2015 Africa showed by far the highest growth rate in mobile subscriptions 
in the world at almost 12% per annum as it caught up quickly to the rest of the world. 
Africa’s mobile subscription at the end of 2015 was 46% of the population of 1.13 
billion. Mobile broadband take-up continues to accelerate and a quarter of all 
connections are to smartphones (226 million in 2015). This is set to rise to 2/3 of all 
subscriptions by 2020. The mobile phone industry has contributed 6.7% of Africa’s 
GDP and 3.8 million jobs in 2015. The global average of mobile subscriptions is 63%, 
and to compare to the rest of the developing world, Africa is lagging behind, with the 
Middle East at 58%, Asia Pacific 62%, and Latin America 65% (GSMA 2016). 
 
Significant barriers to the take-up of mobile services remain. African countries have 
among the highest total cost of mobile ownership as a proportion of income in the 
world. As of first quarter 2016, 3G and 4G networks covered 50% and 16% of the 
population across the region respectively; around 30% lower than the global average. 
(GSMA 2016). 
 
Research has shown that the biggest obstacle to ICT access is cost, and in poor 
countries that cost is far higher than in richer countries. The lowest-earning 75% of 
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mobile phone users Africa spend high proportions of their household income on 
communications, with Kenyans spending as much as 27% (Elder, 2013). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of Internet bandwidth ( ITU Development Bureau Facts and 
Figures 2016). 
 
Figure 5.2 shows bandwidth distribution in the world, with Africa by far the lowest in 
terms of access to higher bandwidth.  There are many reasons for lack of investment 
in Internet bandwidth, despite this being heralded by some as a marker or causal agent 
in economic growth. These are absolute poverty rates, with impoverished 
governments having more pressing calls on the public purse, political instability,   
insurgencies, poverty, unreliable power generation systems, few planning controls, 
prohibitive taxes, geographical obstacles, sparse populations, and difficult legal 
access to rights of way. These factors inhibit the growth of investment in 
telecommunications but commercial drivers have overcome these setbacks as 
witnessed by the rapid growth in mobile services in the last decade.  
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5.3 Space	  technologies	  in	  Africa	  
Telecommunications and remote sensing are two major activities involving space in 
Africa. National security, which is a major driver for space technology in the rest of 
the world, is not prevalent, or data is not publicly available on this subject in the 
African continent. There are other space-driven activities and national space 
programmes run by African countries and some of these involve remote sensing and 
applications affecting the end user. 
 
To try and make meaningful generalisations about the entire continent of Africa can 
lead to misleading conclusions, particularly given the fact that inequalities are greater 
within regions and countries than between. It is possible nevertheless to compare 
initiatives in space and space agencies. A cursory examination of the space activities 
of African countries reveals that few African countries have space agencies, and those 
that exist are not well resourced compared to the rest of the world.  
 
Pan-African space initiatives such as the African Resource Management constellation 
(ARM) have taken many years and many talks, with few concrete outputs. The project 
involves Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, and includes a satellite designed 
in South Africa that may be launched in 2020, with an agreed budget of R500M 
($38.4M). It is a constellation of micro-satellites owned and operated by different 
governments supporting a data source for environmental management information in 
Africa addressing African priorities (Mostert 2007). It sets out to address ‘the need for 
regular high-resolution data over Africa for resource management applications.’ This 
project had a thorough requirements derivation process involving users from African 
countries, with a view to providing applications across a range of subjects: 
agriculture, environment, disaster monitoring, land use, food security, water 
resources, fishing, mineral oil and gas exploration and peace keeping. Although this 
long list of applications may seem over-ambitious, they were crystallised into spatial, 
spectral and temporal resolution requirements using a thorough process. The fact that 
there is very little to show for the years of discussion attests to both the lack of 
resources in the clutch of developing countries in the project, but also to the fact that 
these are separate countries. They are not federated states, provinces, or districts with 
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common heritage. Many African countries are recently formed, riven with internal 
strife and border contests, and poor. 
 
Two other African satellite initiatives are COPINE and RASCOM. Planned at the turn 
of the century, the United Nations project COPINE was to be a satellite-based 
information system that would link scientists, educators and professionals in Africa. 
There is little information about COPINE, and it did not come to fruition. RASCOM, 
the Regional African Satellite Communication Organization, was established in 1993 
to provide telecommunication services, direct TV broadcast services and Internet 
access to rural areas of Africa. A private company registered in Mauritius was to 
implement RASCOM’s first communications satellite. The underlying aim was to 
lower the continent’s dependency on international satellite networks by pooling 
resources. France’s Thales Alenia built the first satellite in France, RASCOM-QAF1, 
which was delivered in orbit in 2007 but crippled by a helium leak, and a second 
replacement satellite, RASCOM-QAF1R, was launched in 2010. Almost 18 years 
after the project initiated, there is one satellite built and launched by the French. 
 
There are some success stories regarding African space endeavours albeit on a 
relatively small scale. In May 2017 the n-Sight1 nanosatellite was successfully 
launched into low Earth orbit from the International Space Station. This was designed 
and built in South Africa and forms part of the European Commission’s QB50 
project. These space activities are few and unfortunately (for sustainability and 
continuity) far between in the continent. 
 
Table 5.1 shows the annual budgets of space agencies as available in the public 
domain. This is not adjusted for type of activity, but gives an idea of African space 
agencies’ budgets compared to rest of the world. It highlights the difference in 
allocation of public funding for space activities between Africa as a region and the 
rest of the world (African countries are shaded in grey). 
 
 
 
 
  88 
5	  
Country/ region Agency Budget (USDM) Year 
United States 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
19,500 2017 
Europe European Space Agency 6,271 2017 
Russia Russian Federal Space Agency 3,272 2015 
 Japan Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency 2,030 2013 
 Germany German Aerospace Center 2,389 2014 
 France French Space Agency 2,170 2014 
 Italy Italian Space Agency 1,800 2014 
 India Indian Space Research Organisation 
1,400 
2017-
18 
 China China National Space Administration 
1,300  
500 (official) 
 
 Canada Canadian Space Agency 488.7  
 United Kingdom UK Space Agency 414  
 South Korea Korea Aerospace Research Institute 366 2007 
 Ukraine State Space Agency of Ukraine 250  
 Argentina Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales 180 2016 
 Iran 
Iranian Space Agency and Iranian Space 
Research Center 
72 + 67 = 139 
2014-
15 
 Spain Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial 135[ 2009 
 Netherlands Netherlands Space Office 110  
 Sweden Swedish National Space Board 100 2011 
 Brazil Brazilian Space Agency 100 2015 
 Pakistan 
Space and Upper Atmosphere Research 
Commission 
75.1 
2010-
11 
  Switzerland Swiss Space Office 10  
 Mexico Mexican Space Agency 8.34  
 Libya Libyan Space Agency No reliable data  
 Nigeria 
National Space Research and Development 
Agency 
20 approx allocated 
2015-
16 
 Kenya Kenya Space Agency No reliable data  
 Egypt 
National Authority for Remote Sending and 
Space Sciences 
8.4 2016 
 Algeria Algerian Space Agency 360 2002 
 South Africa South African National Space Agency 
11.8 
2014-
15 
Table 5.1: Space Agency Budgets (Wikipedia). 
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This is not only involvement in the development of technologies themselves (launch 
facilities, satellite development, ground segment and so on) but also in the 
development of policy, regulatory frameworks and the more peripheral but important 
activities of public education and graduate training programmes. This means that 
African countries are the recipients but not the generators of space technologies. 
 
These space technologies include various relatively new High-Altitude Platforms, 
UAVs and so on, as well as derived applications and services such as cellular 
communications, broadband Internet, and concomitant functions necessary for 
modern society: global positioning, weather forecasting, accurate time keeping, 
disaster mitigation, and so on. The long list of applications that use space data are 
therefore owned, designed, produced, maintained and supplied by agencies outside of 
Africa, and therefore not necessarily primarily for the benefit of those in the region.  
 
Control over remote sensing services is a critical matter of sovereignty and regional 
security. As said by the CEO of the South African National Space Agency, Val 
Munsami in 2017: ‘ …reliance on foreign satellites means that South African satellite 
data users, which include about 40 national and provincial government departments, 
have no control over what images they are sent, what the images focus on and when 
they will get them.’ (Business Day, 03 February 2017). 
5.3.1 Technopolitics	  
One of the challenges in space technologies for Africa is the political dimension, 
where ‘technopolitics’ comes into play, and this does not necessarily bode well for 
end user applications. Focusing on the case of two ambitious government-led ICT 
projects in Ethiopia, Woredanet and Schoolnet, Gagliardone (2014) identified the 
involvement of political forces in these technical projects. What he found was that: 
‘Rather than employing ICTs according to donors’ demands of openness and 
democratization, the Ethiopian government has appropriated them to support its 
ambitious state- and nation-building process, while marginalizing alternative 
ICT uses promoted by other components of society, such as the private sector 
and Ethiopians in the diaspora’ (Gagliardone 2014). 
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The term “technopolitics” accounts for technologies being used for political ends, and 
this is rife in all countries, not only the resource poor. Many space technologies are 
used for political ends, and one could say that the very instigation for space 
technology from Sputnik onwards has been for spying and political competition, such 
as occurred during the 1960’s space race. The difference with technopolitics is that 
there is the notion of a misappropriation, or obfuscation of the real aims of a mission, 
and this has ramifications for ICTs for development discussed below. 
5.4 Space	  applications	  in	  Africa	  
If applications using space-derived data were developed specifically for the African 
continent, what functions would they perform and how would they differ from any 
other applications anywhere else in the world? What are the consequences of the fact 
that the vast majority of space-derived applications are developed outside of Africa 
according to paradigms derived from and suited for different contexts?  
 
Applications using space-derived data in Africa lie chiefly in the domain of remote 
sensing, and the vast majority of these are specific EO studies. These studies for and 
about Africa are carried out by scientists both within and outside of the region, using 
tools such as Geographical Information Systems (GIS), and typically they examine a 
specific geographical area for a particular purpose. They are mainly commissioned by 
developed countries (scientific institutes, governments, aid agencies and NGOs), 
using either public domain data or specifically commissioned and targeted imagery.  
 
The annual African Association of Remote Sensing and the Environment (AARSE) 
conferences attest to the bias on vertical scientific applications, and although worthy 
and necessary, these do not address the majority of the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals nor do they directly affect or address the needs of the general population. 
However useful these scientific applications may be according to their individual and 
specific purposes, they are piecemeal, confined to the science arena, and do not 
constitute widespread services delivered to governments or to the populace.  
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Listed below are typical developing country EO applications, and the numbers of 
papers in these areas were delivered at the AARSE conference which took place in 
Uganda in 2016: 
 
Paper Topic     Number 
   of papers 
Agritech / Food Security 41 
Human Capital Development 7 
Conflict Management 7 
Climate change 26 
Disaster Risk Management and Resilience (Floods / Desertification 
and Fires / Landslides 
28 
Forestry 13 
Water Management 30 
Health 7 
Urban development and management 21 
Administration and Policy 3 
Ecology and Environmental Conservation 33 
 
The papers delivered described examples of EO data applied to particular use cases, 
and these were singular instances of scientific works applied to specific geographical 
areas.  
 
In the ‘global north’ the entire value chain from space imagery to beneficiary is 
unbroken with many integrated services provided by governments and large 
commercial entities. Beneficiaries are digitally literate and have the technical means 
to take advantage of remote sensing data.  
 
To take two examples, remote sensing applied to agriculture is commonplace for large 
farms in the US where agritech has been established for over a decade. It would be 
unthinkable for a large metropolitan planning agency in a major city in the global 
north not to use space imagery in transport planning. In developing countries, the use 
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of space imagery is in its infancy and is still applied without sustained integration into 
ongoing policy and processes.  
 
Disaster Management is a complex field, and utilises heterogeneous data from a wide 
variety of sources, including, crucially, those from space. There are constellations of 
satellites constantly monitoring the Earth for signs of imminent natural extreme 
phenomena such as tornados and tsunamis, as well as the usual weather monitoring 
satellites. These constellations, such as the Disaster Monitoring Constellation for 
International Imaging (DMCii), monitor forests for deforestation, analyse climate and 
high-risk areas for food security, fires (though there are as well satellites primed only 
to seek out fires), and provide imagery to assist disaster relief efforts. As one would 
expect, these projects are internationally funded. Natural disasters do not obey 
national boundaries, and a considerable degree of expertise and resources are required 
to combine international data sources and organise responses. The EO component of 
disaster management is managed by international organisations, and African countries 
are reliant on data from satellites outside of their control to monitor and manage 
disasters. Although space assets are extremely useful both in determining the nature 
of the disaster and its impact, and also in providing communications where local 
infrastructure may be damaged, there are many logistical and organisational issues on 
the ground which hamper relief efforts (Dinas et al. 2015). The domain of disaster 
management provides a response to the hubris often found where novel technologies 
are deployed.  
 
That images of Africa from space are not as widely used as images taken over other 
regions, or that images are not routinely taken by satellites passing over Africa 
(processed, stored, transmitted etc.), is not only because they are prohibitively 
expensive. The organisations and business processes that would utilise them are not in 
place in Africa. The demand is not provided by a populace or their governments, 
which are either digitally illiterate for the most part, or unaware of the benefits which 
can accrue from space imagery. African governments chiefly lack the continuity of 
expertise and intra-governmental processes and organisations to feed into services 
that can use space imagery. In the near future at least the cost barrier may be 
addressed.  
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5.5 Disruptive	  space	  technologies	  and	  Africa	  
The prime characteristic of disruptive innovation is that it offers either novel services, 
or much cheaper or more accessible services. Swarms of cheaper satellites are being 
launched by the disruptors, mentioned in the previous chapter, with global coverage. 
The price for satellite data is falling, and images become more widely available to 
Africa. The population of Africa is becoming wealthier, and is, more than ever, 
located in cities that are easier to service in terms of remote sensing and 
telecommunications. Here are two disruptive initiatives that will address availability 
and price. There are of course other attributes of space imagery required for scientific 
or vertical applications, where specific frequency, time and image resolutions are 
needed. However these initiatives may bridge gaps in Internet access and basic EO 
data provision. 
 
OneWeb’s goal is: ‘To fully bridge the Digital Divide by 2027, making Internet 
access available and affordable for everyone’ (Oneweb.world). OneWeb is building 
and launching 648 satellites communicating with small low-cost user terminals that 
can be located anywhere in the world. These can extend the reach of existing 
telecommunications networks as well as provide capability to create a local mobile 
network (e.g. for emergency situations).  
 
Closer to the people and linking in with Coca-Cola’s Internet of Things strategy, 
Coca-Cola South Africa, local bottling partner Coca-Cola Fortune, and BT (British 
Telecom) joined forces in 2014 to initiate a project to provide Internet access points at 
drinks dispensers. The aim is to provide those who have little Internet connectivity 
with 30 minutes of free-of-charge, uncapped access per device each day via their Wi-
Fi-enabled drinks coolers. The vending machines are turned into hotspots by adding 
large routers that link to satellites via VSAT antennae. The results of their pilot, 
which involves two sites in South Africa, are not yet available.  
 
Planet and SpaceX mentioned in Chapter 4 both have initiatives that will result in EO 
data being made available more cheaply, or free, for Africa. The implication is  that 
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there should be an increase in the use of EO imagery in Africa for various purposes as 
imagery becomes cheaper and more plentiful.  
 
In Malawi, a project using drones is underway after a successful pilot. UNICEF and 
the Malawian government have launched a project that will use unmanned drones to 
carry out humanitarian efforts in the country and, eventually, the whole continent. The 
drones will carry out three tasks: imagery, telecommunications to extend Wi-Fi and 
cellular signals, and delivery of small packets. 
 
Whether these innovations prove catalytic for social change, as the mobile phone has 
done in Africa, remains to be seen. (Baumann et al. 2006) identified a particular type 
of disruptive innovation he named ‘catalytic’ as they are ‘distinguished by their 
primary focus on social change, often on a national scale’. Remote sensing aids allow 
certain types of decision to be made particularly by large corporations and 
governments. These could bring about better provision of services with improved 
knowledge of populations and terrain, better change detection and so on. The wide 
availability of remote sensing data in Africa can also promote democracy by making 
it difficult for governments to hide humanitarian or environmental abuses.  
5.6 ICTs	  for	  development	  
As early as the 1950s, Information Communication Technologies for social 
development has been a topic of enquiry with concomitant journals and conferences 
to stimulate action. ICT4D, as it is known, began as a response to the digital divide, in 
recognition of the importance of joining the knowledge economy for developing 
countries. 
 
Health, education and governance are the main themes for ICT4D applications, as 
these entail social benefit. The main themes of the 2016 AARSE conference would be 
recognised as worthy subjects by ICT4D. What ICT4D often misses is the 
contribution of commerce to economic development, and to the traditional public 
benefit areas of ICT4D. Banking and personal finance, insurance, entertainment, e-
commerce (B2C), e-business (B2B) and social media are important components of the 
knowledge economy, and of the lives of the poor. Current ICT4D (version 2.0, as it is 
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known, from the late 2000s onwards) is about reframing the poor as active producers 
and innovators of digital artefacts. 
 
There are many problems in transposing applications across social contexts. As Heeks 
observed in 2008:  
‘… developers rapidly recognized that plugging a peasant farmer or slum-
dweller   into Google offered limited value. Much of the information they 
required would not emerge because it was not in digital format.’ 
 
‘Pro-poor innovation occurs outside poor communities, but on their behalf … 
it runs into the danger of design versus reality gaps:  a mismatch between the 
assumptions and requirements built into the design and the on-the-ground 
realities of poor’ (Heeks 2008). 
 
This chimes with the author’s experience described in the Introduction with the 
Ugandan judiciary’s computerisation project. Assumptions are made by developers 
within and from the developed world, who at best regard their beneficiaries as like 
themselves but with less cash to spend. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, Schlagert  
stated in 1953 that few engineers are trained in the fields of economics, psychology 
and marketing, and we would add, anthropology.  
 
As a result of the imposition of technological projects upon developing countries 
which have been developed from and for a different social and economic context, 
many ICT4D projects have floundered and have proved unsustainable or their 
artefacts and assets not used for the purposes for which they were intended. This was 
found to be the case by Gomez (2014) who noticed that Public Access Computing 
venues  ‘appear to be used more for building and maintaining users’ social networks, 
personal relations and entertainment, and less for education, health, e-government or 
e-commerce activities.’(Gomez 2014). That poor people spend money on 
entertainment and personal relations comes as a surprise to those who feel that they 
should spend their resources on betterment activities such as education and health, 
which is often the (rather sanctimonious) subtext of ICT4D.  
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It is therefore more likely that the reason why ICT4D projects have not changed the 
world much is that they are an academic pursuit. Their primary output is academic 
papers, not an improvement of the lives of the poor. There is a dearth of research into 
the non-academic impact of ICT4D research, ironically identified in an academic 
paper aimed at researchers, by Harris in The Impact of Research on Development 
Policy: This Much We Know, which states that ‘there is little if any impact on practice 
and policymaking in ICT4D’ (Harris 2015). Whilst he offers a list of practical 
solutions, he recognises the need for incentives for academics to perform tasks outside 
of their remit, and urges research institute administrators and academics to ‘provide 
strong leadership in supporting cultural changes’. There is no notion in his work that 
academics may not actually be capable or suited to work outside of a university 
setting, often situated in the global north. 
 
That ICT4D remains an academic pursuit makes it even less likely to reach engineers 
who create space technologies removed from end users and real impact. However 
there are initiatives concerning at least EO for Africa, that draw together African 
countries to share experiences and pool resources, mentioned below. 
5.7 Institutional	  data	  and	  applications	  for	  Africa	  	  
The African Group on Earth Observation (AfriGEOSS) falls under the Group on 
Earth Observation (GEO) initiative, which is a worldwide network and initiative 
whose aim is to: ‘connect the demand for sound and timely environmental 
information with the supply of data and information about the Earth that is collected 
through observing systems and made available by the GEO community.’ (GEO 
website). As such it is committed to Open Science. A primary tool of GEO is GEOSS, 
the Global Earth Observation System of Systems, which is ‘a set of coordinated, 
independent Earth observation, information and processing systems that interact and 
provide access to diverse information for a broad range of users in both public and 
private sectors.’ 
 
Governments and policy makers are the core stakeholders and raison d’être of 
GEOSS. Oddly they do not appear to be very interested in the end user. The latest 
AfriGEOSS symposium in Ghana in June 2017 mentions the user once in the list of 
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its objectives: ‘Engage with end users, understanding needs and mechanisms to 
deliver user driven (sic) Earth observations solutions’, though none of the 
symposium’s panels, sessions, or posters reflected this. The outcomes of this 
symposium, which did not necessarily reflect the content of the presentations, did 
mention the term ‘users’ in four instances amongst over seven pages of lists of 
actions. The term ‘community’ is mentioned liberally without qualification or specific 
details as to how users and the community would be addressed. It appears that there is 
no alignment between what the symposium aimed to address and the practical 
mechanisms or even research to do so. 
 
GEOSS aims to enlarge the user community but they are not enlarging or elaborating 
upon the concept of the user. Astonishingly, the word ‘user’ does not appear once on 
the GEOSS mandate, vision, mission and value web page 
(https://www.earthobservations.org/vision.php). Searching their site for documents 
with the word ‘user’ returns no results either. However the recently published GEO 
Strategic Plan 2016-2025 has redressed the balance and, in its 55 pages does mention 
the user (including end user) 30 times (GEO 2015). Whether this entails any plan to 
understand their putative users is not known. 
 
The Monitoring for Environment and Security forum in Africa (MESA) is an EU 
programme whose objective is to support African decision-makers and planners in 
designing and implementing policies and development plans in areas which can be 
addressed by EO data. The project takes place from 2013-2018 involving all African 
countries. The initiative includes various services including training, the provision of 
reports and tools and other enabling technologies to improve the use of EO data. Like 
other initiatives it is geared towards the scientific and technological and does not 
concern itself directly with users or beneficiaries. 
 
What these and other programmes show is a strong bias towards individual scientific 
projects using EO data. Each one has its rationale and outcomes, but they are not 
geared towards users who are non-specialist. They are designed and operate well 
within a scientific paradigm. This is not to criticise such useful programmes and 
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initiatives, but to point out that they are not designed for, nor concerned with, the 
user. 
5.8 Pre-­‐requisites	   for	   more	   pervasive	   space	   technology	   in	   and	   for	  
Africa	  
Carl Sagan famously said in Episode 9 of his 1980 TV series Cosmos:  ‘If you want to 
make an apple pie from scratch, you must first create the universe.’ Economic and 
social development are holistic enterprises involving the interactions of many 
complex systems. If the end goal is pervasive space technologies in Africa, where 
remote sensing is utilised in the same manner in which it is in the global north, then a 
raft of inter-related infrastructures and features need to be put in place. If ICT4D is to 
become redundant, is it only access to broadband by the vast majority of people in 
Africa which will satisfy criteria to retire ICT4D?  
 
What this raft of inter-related infrastructures and features consists of is not obvious. 
Even what could be considered basic pre-requisites such as a constant electricity 
supply are not actually needed, as can be seen in the example of Coca-Cola’s drinks-
and-Wi-Fi dispensers, where fuel-driven generators provide the power. 
Telecommunications infrastructure could also be thought of as necessary, but this has 
been ‘leap-frogged’ in Africa by mobile cellular technologies, allowing telephony to 
spread rapidly, with no impedance from pre-existing networks and relationships. 
Initiatives to provide Internet access by balloon or UAVs prove that widespread 
terrestrial or even satellite infrastructure is not technically required. 
 
While limitations and barriers to physical pre-requisites may be addressed or 
circumvented, social and cultural barriers are harder to identify. Changing governance 
and business practices to incorporate new ways of obtaining and acting on 
information is not a straightforward undertaking and there are no common blueprints 
to apply across the African continent. As shown above, barriers to the further use of 
space technology in Africa are not merely economic but cover many governmental 
and organisational factors, as well as cultural norms which are further explored 
below. 
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Furthermore, even if the Internet were widely available, economic development does 
not necessarily follow. Access to the Internet may be necessary for inclusion in a 
knowledge economy, but the relationship between this and economic development 
(lower unemployment, higher GDP) is not proven. This is a highly contentious and 
much-examined area of ICT4D research. 
 
In their study on engagement with the knowledge economy in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Ojanperä et al. 2017 reveal that:  
‘While connectivity is an important enabler of digital content creation, it 
seems to be only a necessary, not a sufficient condition; wealth, innovation 
capacity, and public spending on education are also important factors.’  
 
They conclude from their research that: ‘transformation into a knowledge economy 
requires far more concentrated effort than simply increasing Internet connectivity.’  
 
Their study examined knowledge-intensive content creation, their three key metrics 
being spatial distributions of academic articles, collaborative software development, 
and Internet domain registrations. What they found was that in sub-Saharan Africa, 
compared to other geographic regions in the world, more academic articles were 
produced (traditional knowledge production) than ‘digitally mediated knowledge 
production’ (collaborative software development, and Internet domain registrations). 
The former do not translate directly, if at all, into economic growth. Academic 
institutions, while perhaps necessary for long-term economic development, are a cost 
that a country must bear, rather than a source of income. However this academic bias 
isn’t hard to understand from the point of view of individuals in the LDCs.  
 
The work of Jeffery (2010) concludes that the middle classes in postcolonial countries 
reproduce their power through cultural and social strategies, not through business: ‘In 
the context of an underdeveloped formal economy, middle-class status often depends 
upon being able to marshal cultural capital and social connections successfully.’ 
When considering space technologies for Africa, it is the middle classes who will 
engage with them, and whilst ICT4D typically focuses on the poorest sectors of 
society and public good, it is the middle classes, the digitally literate with education 
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and access to the Internet, who would typically utilise and be champions of space 
technologies in the science, policy and business sectors. 
 
It is worth touching on who this middle class is in Africa. Are they homogenous? 
What are their aspirations, values and constraints? Can the same criteria be applied to 
the middle classes in each African country? Since the early 1990s there has been 
increased interest in the concept of a ‘global middle class’; whether this exists, how 
they may be identified and whether there are similarities worldwide in their attitudes 
and behaviours.  
 
Shimeles and Ncube (2015) point out that in Asia and Latin America, the middle 
classes played a driving role in economic development, but there had been very little 
interest or statistics about the middle classes in Africa. Using Demographic and 
Health Survey data for 37 countries covering the period 1990-2011, they show a 
modest rise in the size of the middle class in most African countries in the study. The 
probability of retaining middle-class status over the period was high at 75%, though 
the probability of becoming asset-poor was very high, at 84%. Their careful statistical 
analysis concluded that the continent continues to struggle with widespread poverty 
and deprivation and that a very important factor driving asset ownership is education 
(Shimeles & Ncube 2015). They also portray a complex picture where it is difficult to 
make generalisations and comparisons between the middle classes in Africa and 
elsewhere. 
 
 Loayza et al. (2012) found that a large middle class can play an important role in 
reforming institutions: 
‘When the size of the middle class increases (measured as the proportion of 
people with income above 10 US dollars a day in purchasing power parity 
(PPP) terms), social policy on health and education becomes more active and 
the quality of governance regarding democratic participation and official 
corruption improves.’  
 
While there is a correlation between well-functioning institutions and the existence of 
a robust middle class, it is not clear whether this relationship is causal. It is not hard to 
see that good institutions and governance are necessary for using EO data. Therefore 
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it could be concluded that a strong middle class is necessary in a country to foster 
utilisation of space technology.  
 
Note that the definition for inclusion in the middle class sector used by Loayza is 
merely $10 income per day, which, on top of other vital expenses, won’t pay for a 
computer or Smartphone with broadband subscription. Perhaps it ought to be the 
upper classes that are investigated with respect to space technology.  
5.9 Pre-­‐requisites	  to	  support	  Earth	  Observation	  applications	  
At present there are many projects to introduce the benefits of space imagery to 
farmers in Africa.  Improving agricultural yields, managing climate change and 
drought, and modernising agriculture in Africa are important subjects. The use of 
imagery from space is crucial in improving agriculture in Africa and in assessing food 
security According to the latest update from the agricultural monitoring project 
AfriGAM, presented to the 2017 Proceedings of the AfriGEOSS Symposium, food 
production needs to increase by 70% by 2050 (AfriGEOSS 2017 Final Proceedings). 
Projects using space imagery for improving food security for Africa and for 
monitoring effects of climate change are run by international funding programmes 
and universities, usually with a combination of local and overseas expertise and 
resources. A good example is provided by the paper Assessing drought probability for 
agricultural areas in Africa with coarse resolution remote sensing imagery (Rojas et 
al. 2011), which uses data from a variety of satellites including other food security 
projects such as the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, a USAID programme. 
This is typical of multilateral remote sensing projects: they are highly technical and 
scientific involving a great many scientists and technologists.  
 
The use of space technology to improve crop yields presupposes a particular set of 
conditions if the end user is a farmer. The farmer must have a need for specific 
information about crop health, and must be able to interpret the data and act on it. The 
farmer must exist in an environment where to use external sources for information is 
accepted practice, and where information veracity can be judged. For this, a certain 
degree of institutional supporting measures must be in place: perhaps a Farmers’ 
Union which can act as an interface to government, to specify and interpret 
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requirements for space imagery; training and information dissemination programmes 
must be present so the farmer hears about and understands new initiatives, and can 
assess the return on investment. The farmer also must have resources, be they 
financial or personnel, to spend on the technology needed to utilise space data. The 
farm must be a substantial size to warrant the investment. Lastly, the attitude of the 
farmer must be one that embraces new processes and approaches, in short, an 
educated and empowered individual who can harness information, perform their own 
analysis, conclusions, and have the confidence to act afresh. There must be a good 
relationship between the landowner and the person who works on the land. Farmers in 
Africa rarely own the land they work on.  
 
A pre-requisite for EO for urban development in Africa is governmental institutions 
with capacity to use EO data. In South Africa for example, municipalities have begun 
to use images from a variety of high-altitude platforms, airborne vehicles and 
satellites to manage cities, though these activities are still in their infancy. New 
business processes, key performance indicators for officials, and general attitudes and 
other aspects of change management need to come into effect.  
 
Health covers a plethora of different approaches to using space data, from SMS 
reminders to comply with medicine ingest, to determining geographical areas for 
disease control and drug supplies. Healthcare informatics for developing countries is a 
well-funded and researched topic, and like many others linked to ICT4D often does 
not concern itself directly with space technologies. 
 
What is common to EO-based projects is a focus on the technology itself. Individual 
EO projects are well funded and resourced by external agencies, and are successful in 
achieving their specific objectives; but these are projects, not routine processes 
embedded into governance structures, policy and practice. Projects come with a date 
when funding dries up and when project activity ceases. For EO data to be 
incorporated into routine processes in Africa requires a list of actions, depending on 
the objectives, at the very least: 
• Government infrastructures must be functional (e.g. research institutes, 
statistical bureaux). 
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• These agencies must have the capacity to utilise EO data 
• Processes and policies must be in place and enforceable 
 
EO projects with a view to sustainability tend to focus on technical training alone, 
whilst there are many other aspects to continued use of EO data. Government 
institutions continue to strengthen in Africa over time, but strong institutes are a 
necessary although not sufficient pre-requisite for the sustained usage of EO material. 
Social and cultural aspects, which are typically absent from space technology 
projects, play their part in determining whether and how EO can be successfully 
integrated into processes and working practices. 
5.10 Technology	  and	  cultural	  norms	  
A technocentric view ignores the social and cultural components that may determine 
whether and how a technology is used in any given context. The same technology 
may be used in different ways in different countries or contexts, making international 
or intercultural generalisations and assumptions about technology acceptance and use 
difficult. There is a body of research on the intercultural organisational and social 
factors surrounding technology use, particularly in the field of ICT4D, but this 
remains largely within the originating academic disciplines. It is little wonder that 
engineers and the designers and procurers of space technology are unaware of these 
intricacies.  
 
Even what appear to be the most straightforward space-derived benefits, such as the 
provision of weather forecasting, are riddled with complexity and social contention, 
as Amissah-Arthur (2003) found in rural Kenya. Over a decade ago, research into 
climate forecasts for rural farmers in Kenya identified a gap between available 
services and information that was ‘likely to be useful to farmers’. Amissah-Arthur’s 
approach to ameliorate this situation was to create a typology of users based on their 
geographical locations which, she felt, determined many other factors such as their 
production systems, market forces that determine credit, demand, and input 
availability. The outcome of her study was a methodology that would enable climate 
information to be better targeted. Her own conclusion was that her study was limited 
for several reasons, one of them because it didn’t target the ‘decision-makers’ 
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(presumably the land owners and not the farmers themselves).  ‘…the capability to 
integrate these forecasts with farmer’s agricultural strategies and their decision 
making processes are still very weak’.  
 
An example of more recent research which does involve the end user with greater 
sophistication, is Baptista and Oliveira’s 2015 study on mobile banking, applying the 
extended Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT2) 
mentioned in Chapter 2 and shown in Figure 5.3. This research incorporates cultural 
values to examine how groups of people in Africa take up mobile banking. This study 
is significant because of the importance of mobile banking to regions where access to 
financial services remains problematic, such as for those living in rural areas. In many 
African countries a visit to the bank is a lengthy, costly and unpleasant affair 
involving difficult physical access in city centres, hours of queuing, and, in many 
countries, significant danger in travelling from a bank with cash.  
 
Using the modified technology acceptance model, Baptista and Oliveira were able to 
analyse some of the factors influencing users’ acceptance of mobile banking out of a 
collection of cultural moderators. A limitation of their research was that the cultural 
models adopted could not be used to generalise about a country since cultures vary 
widely within countries. This is a limitation for all cultural studies, and one of the 
difficulties of trying to incorporate social factors into technological design. 
 
The most visible and successful mobile banking service in Africa is the Kenyan M-
Pesa system, launched in 2007. This allows money transfer, financing and micro 
financing services using a mobile phone. In Africa, M-Pesa has now expanded to 
other East African countries. Examining what factors encourage or inhibit users to 
take up such services should at some point filter through to developers who can then 
tailor their offering, though Baptista and Oliveira offer no mechanism by which this 
may occur, exhorting only further academic research. 
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Figure 5.3: Unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT2) model  
(Baptista & Oliveira 2015). 
 
Anthropologists dig deeper than information specialists or technologists into cultural 
practices, with a greater philosophical and theoretical rigour. Two fields of enquiry 
have arisen since the 1970s. The field of Science and Technology Studies looks at the 
interstices between the history of technology and material culture, and the philosophy 
of science. Digital anthropology examines modern digital technologies through the 
lens of social anthropology.  
 
Anthropology has long been interested in space as a social construct. Social 
geographers researching GIS systems within their research frameworks noted that 
‘boundary objects separate different social groups at the same time that they delineate 
important points of reference between them’ (Harvey & Chrisman 1998). GIS 
systems and the technology that supports them are not socially and politically neutral. 
They are constructed within a particular social paradigm. The concept of boundary 
objects within social-constructivist theory gives us new ways of looking at the 
relationship between society and technology. The boundaries reinforced or created by 
GIS systems do not occur within a social and political vacuum: ‘…every instance of 
GIS technology is embedded in an intricate web of social relationships, and remains 
surrounded by multiple contentions (Curry, 1994; Sheppard, 1995 quoted in Harvey 
and Chrisman, 1998). GIS technologies are created within a complex web of 
negotiated relationships between a great many stakeholders, all with their agendas and 
desired outcomes for the GIS activity. What is included and excluded from a mapping 
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exercise, what is interpreted as standard, and what boundary objects are chosen as 
significant; each of these decisions occurs within a socially constructed setting.  
 
The user within this setting may be the GIS specialist inputting the data or 
constructing the ontologies and structures that will guide the data input technician. It 
can also be the person who reads the ensuing reports and takes decisions based on 
them; the client who wrote the plan guiding the GIS project or the agency paying for 
it are all important stakeholders. At each turn, the decisions made in any GIS project 
are done so according to implicit rules, attitudes and values that are highly contingent 
and can be negotiated.  
 
As can be seen in the example of the construction of a GIS tool and its data, the user, 
even the end user, is a category that can be decomposed. When Harvey and Chrisman 
turn their attention on a micro level to a specific remote sensing project observing 
wetlands in the US, they pinpoint scores of actors in the network, and attest to the 
social complexity of the endeavour: ‘GIS technology and technoscience are not 
monolithic autonomous edifices but the localized results of processes of negotiation 
that involve the construction of artefacts to fit various social perspectives’ (Harvey & 
Chrisman 1998). 
 
More recently, DeNicola (2012) has explored the interdisciplinary field of what he 
calls geomedia, a confluence of social geography and media studies. DeNicola has 
conducted ethnographic work on the training of satellite image interpreters in India, 
concluding that: ‘…digital culture is posited as placeless and homogenizing, [but] 
when it comes to actual practice, digital culture remains thoroughly socialized and 
materially entangled with spatial experience’ (DeNicola 2012). His work is published 
in Digital Anthropology, a collection of studies by anthropologists interrogating not 
only the impact of digital technologies on human life, but also how these technologies 
can be used to reflect on how humans define themselves. 
5.11 The	  user	  concept	  in	  African	  space	  technology	  projects	  
As can be concluded by the discussions above, the user is part of an information 
system, and that information system is bound up with and dependent upon space 
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technologies. That information system is also part of a wider, fluid and amorphous 
social context. The end user or beneficiary of any space technology project lies many 
steps, organisations and processes away from the instigators of that project, and those 
instigators have little knowledge of the end users.  
 
All actors within a system are part of a social environment, not only the end users. 
That social environment dictates all actions and designs. The engineer developers 
themselves are subject to constraints they are largely unaware of in their endeavours, 
as are the clients and organisations who specify the space missions. How this affects 
the purpose of this study will be further exhumed in Chapter 6. 
 
In Africa, with its characteristics of poverty, poor administration and governance, and 
geographically dispersed populations, the gap between technology project and user is 
attenuated. In addition, the user is subject to technologies developed by and for 
different contexts, and contexts that do not take cultural differences into 
consideration. 
 
Technological projects in Africa tend to be in the ICT4D domain, where the users are 
beneficiaries. These are well researched but not well integrated nor sustainable. The 
problems found routinely with technology adoption in the global north are amplified 
in the global south. This phenomenon is described by Toyama in the ‘Law of 
Amplification: A Simple but Powerful Theory of Technology’s Social Impact’ 
(Toyama 2015). He points out that theories of social determinism (which underpin 
many anthropological frameworks) say that technology is created according to human 
intentions. At the same time, the degree of technological impact depends on existing 
human capacities. It follows therefore that ‘technology’s primary effect is to amplify 
human forces’ (Toyama 2015). 
 
In The Road Ahead, Bill Gates wrote:  
‘The first rule of any technology used in a business is that automation applied 
to an efficient operation will magnify the efficiency. The second is that 
automation applied to an inefficient operation will magnify the 
inefficiency’ (Gates et al. 1995). 
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In extensive studies on educational technology throughout the world, Toyama found 
that introducing the Internet and computer technology can be a distraction and burden, 
and that there is no substitute for good teachers, well-resourced schools, and 
conscientious parents. The student end user, in order to benefit from technology, 
requires a raft of infrastructure: IT support, budget for upgrades and maintenance, 
highly trained teachers. In developing countries these are harder to put in place, and 
additionally the global south suffers from climatic and social conditions contributing 
to more expensive technology upkeep: dust, heat, vandalism and theft, and more 
costly telecommunications. 
 
The same can be true of remote sensing projects, where space images are to be 
integrated into GIS-based projects. The communities who will use those images need 
them to have certain characteristics of spatial, frequency and time resolution. The end 
users of those projects, be they government policy makers, GIS programmers, or the 
beneficiary (farmer, local community, citizens), need continuous support. A one-off 
project with its self-contained budget, start and end dates, will not impact society in 
any substantial or sustainable way. 
 
The users of Earth imagery are those involved in sophisticated projects and generally 
GIS tools are brought in to embed Earth images into an information system that can 
be interpreted by specialists. The beneficiaries of such systems are diverse and many 
are not aware that they exist: the general population benefitting from a forest not 
entirely burning down; insurance companies who need to correctly assess premiums 
for properties potentially subject to coastal erosion; citizens who need to be protected 
from food scarcity; road users who need to travel in a timely, orderly fashion. 
However rational or scientific GIS systems may appear to the engineer or scientist, 
they are, as we have shown, part of a complex social system complete with values and 
norms, which are opaque to both engineer and end user.  
 
Two features emerge from this chapter. All actors, from technology creator to end 
user act from within a social system whose workings they are likely to be unaware of. 
Each actor has particular views on the system; only it is the technologists’ views that 
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obtain. The end user in Africa is by and large a passive recipient of technology 
developed and imposed from elsewhere.  
 
Secondly to use space data properly, whether it be telecommunications or remote 
sensing data, entails a list of pre-requisites which are for the most part social and 
political rather than technological. The consequences of these features will be 
explored in the final chapter. 
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6 Exploration 
In examining the user concept and how this frames satellite missions, we have 
compared the space and IT industries in how they view and treat the user. Specifically 
the architectures of space and IT developments were dissected to get to the detail of 
how the user and user requirements are characterised and determined. Next, there was 
an exploration of so-called disruptive space technologies, where the IT industry has 
encroached into the territory of the space industry. Due in part to the business models 
and structure of the space industry, as shown in Chapter 2, the distance between the 
user and developers in the space industry continues to be very large. Lastly, in 
Chapter 5, we looked at the consequences of this gap for the African continent, and 
what this means in terms of the design, application and take up of space-derived 
technologies in cultural contexts very different to their origins. 
 
Space technologies do not exist in a social and political vacuum. What then are the 
tools available to interrogate the social, political, and cultural environment of a space 
artefact or mission? Why should there be a vast gap between understanding of the 
users’ contexts and the development of space missions whose end results are 
technologies to be used by citizens? Should there in fact be any cognisance of users 
from other cultures, or is it the case that everyone on Earth must adapt to the cultural 
framework of whatever technologies are presented? This includes adapting local 
regulatory and legal matters as well as business practices and norms. It is not as trivial 
a matter as American English being taken as the norm (as American spell-checkers 
become the arbiter of written English language), but is a thorough manifestation of 
technological colonialism. 
 
This study has maintained that there are architectural reasons why the user is not 
adequately considered in the design of space missions and applications, and that the 
usual development processes preclude adequate treatment of the user. In addition, the 
structure of the space industry means that the end user is not consulted directly or 
thoroughly about mission goals. There are other reasons: risk aversion in the space 
industry, as well as the greater length of the value chain compared to other technical 
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domains. But beyond these reasons are deeper structures at play. This chapter 
explores these broad, related questions and points to some underlying causes. 
6.1 Technocentrism	  
One of the shortfalls of most approaches to the analysis of technology is the assumed 
deterministic quality of research. The viewpoint for analysis is taken from the 
technology under study itself, and assumptions about the use of that technology are 
made on the basis of technology, analysing reactions to technology according to 
success factors and Key Performance Indicators that are technologically biased. Many 
other perspectives on technology exist, although the body of knowledge on this 
subject is not generally known, accessible, or available to those who create 
technologies.  
 
As discussed below, technicians are not schooled in divorcing a technological artefact 
from the social, political and environmental context of its original design. That 
environmental context includes the business environment, regulatory frameworks, 
national policies and stakeholder types which obtain in any particular country, as well 
as norms and values implicit to a community of practice. An engineer or developer 
may not be aware that the technologies they develop are created within a particular 
social paradigm at all, and therefore be insensitive to alternative environments. 
Bearing in mind the case study presented in the Introduction concerning an 
information system conceived and designed elsewhere for implementation by the 
Ugandan judiciary, a lack of awareness of differences in social context are very real 
and have impact on the effectiveness or applicability of technology. 
 
An engineer would read nothing amiss in the statement that there are markets in 
Africa for high-resolution space imagery. In fact, nobody needs high-resolution 
images. People need to better plan for emergency services to support informal 
settlements; farmers need to know when is the best time to plant and harvest; those in 
business need to connect with each other. To describe a market in terms of a 
technological artefact is technocentric. There is nothing wrong with this as a 
shorthand for those working in the field. Unfortunately this becomes technocentrism, 
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as this viewpoint becomes pervasive and unquestioned in the space industry, and the 
focus turns away from the end user to a particular feature of technology.  
 
The space industry’s chief concern is technology: the technology to get into space and 
stay there, and perform a useful function whilst in orbit. Most people working in the 
industry are naturally interested and educated in technology. Similarly in the IT 
industry, the terms ‘geek’, ‘nerd’, and ‘propeller-head’ are proudly borne. However, 
as shown above, the IT industry has had to turn its attention to the end user in order to 
survive in a highly competitive, high product-turnover environment. The space 
industry, mostly led by governments, has not had to be consumer-orientated, and the 
task of attending to end users has fallen to others. 
 
An interesting question is whether these end users are worth consulting. Since 
technologists understand the limitations of their craft and end users do not, it could be 
said that technocentrism is justified. Consulting end users is not thought to result in 
useful material that can be applied to technology design. The IT industry’s JAD 
sessions, workshops and brainstorming sessions involving end users may not be 
relevant to satellite developers, who can anticipate what image characteristics a 
particular application may need. In some satellite projects, the client is unsure about 
requirements, and the developer must assist the client in their determination, and this 
can involve indirect consultations with potential end users. These scenarios are 
described in informal discussions with satellite developers, but are not formalised. 
 
Sometimes, technology developers deliberately release products without knowing 
what the end user wants. In fact, they sometimes create markets for their products 
where none existed or were dreamt of by users. As Bloomberg Business Week 
declared in their online article about tiny satellites ushering in a new space revolution: 
‘Planet Labs and other companies are sending hundreds of low-cost satellites into 
orbit. We’re only beginning to understand how that will change life on Earth’ 
(Bloomberg Business Week, June 29 2017). The new space start-ups ‘envision an era 
in which rockets take off daily, filling the skies with satellites that sense Earth’s every 
action—in effect building a computational shell around our planet’. Vertical markets 
(such as agritech or weather forecasting) may be mentioned by new space start-ups in 
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their marketing material, but in fact they are not clear about exactly who will use this 
‘computational shell’ or why. It just seems like a good idea. To be fair, not all good 
business ideas are backed by lengthy academic discourse and theory, business models 
and thorough, rational consideration. Nevertheless, with hindsight it is sometimes 
possible to trace the history and philosophy of certain approaches and movements, to 
‘peer under the hood’, which is what we attempt to do below. 
6.2 Theoretical	  approaches	  to	  IS	  design	  and	  behaviour	  	  
As has been established in this study, the applications of certain space technologies, 
be they through remote sensing or telecommunications, form part of information 
systems. If an engineer or developer is tasked with designing a system for use in a 
cultural setting (and all settings are cultural) which is very different to one with which 
he or she is familiar, it is unlikely that they would be able to call upon complex 
sociological theories to assist in the design process, nor apply them to their work. As 
Walsham states:  
‘…working with ICTs in and across different cultures should prove to be 
problematic, in that there will be different views of the relevance, 
applicability, and value of particular modes of working and use of ICTs which 
may produce conflict’ (Walsham 2002). 
 
Added to which, cultures are not static, and each location where a system will be 
deployed will consist of many different cultural modes and responses to that system. 
There is no one ‘African’ culture as could be implied by the title of this study, and not 
even a homogenous ‘middle-class culture’ as we found in the previous chapter. What 
is meant by cultural sensitivity, or to create a technological artefact responsive to 
culture, is an open-ended, undefined, non-linear and changing problem. These are not 
the sorts of problems for which engineers are trained to find solutions. The term 
‘culture’ itself is fluid and open to interpretation, and hardly likely to be used as an 
item in any data dictionary, functional decomposition, or product breakdown 
structure. It is left deliberately undefined here, but could be thought of as a collection 
of shared values, symbols and behavioural norms pertaining to a defined group of 
people. 
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Over time, ideas from the social sciences can percolate through to become ‘general 
knowledge’ and form part of the zeitgeist of a society. For instance, some Freudian 
and Jungian concepts have found their way into common parlance, such as ‘the 
collective unconscious’ and ‘Freudian slip’. However there is no direct or formal 
route from social sciences research through to engineering. Over the last 15 years or 
so, some notions from social anthropology have found their way into the academic 
subject of Information Systems, but this constitutes a very tenuous link to space 
engineering practice, artefacts and applications. 
 
At the turn of this century, the academic field of Information Systems began to take 
an interest in sociology and in particular social anthropology, to provide a framework 
for cultural analysis. A promising approach is provided by structuration theory, as 
discussed by Walsham (2002). Here, he proposes a practical tool based on 
structuration theory to assist in the understanding of a given social environment into 
which an IS may be introduced. The tool itself, which is a table designed to highlight 
features of a specific IS implementation, cannot be taken at face value, and a deep 
grasp of sociological theory is required to glean practical value from it. Outside of 
academia it is not pragmatic to believe that this analytical tool could be adopted by 
software developers or engineers in order to improve implementation or, for example, 
to understand or address user-resistance. 
 
Sociological theories require a whole new field of discourse and framework of 
reference and values, of a type not to be found in an engineering curriculum. 
Structuration theory (Giddens 1986) is especially intractable, is not formulaic, and 
cannot be understood on its own without having grasped something of the history and 
lexicon of sociological thought. Furthermore, it is unlikely that new complex 
perspectives in Information Systems will be taken up by commercial entities unless 
they can be reduced to simplistic models, and the application of Table 6.1 is 
deceptively complicated. This particular tool is shown here as an example of the 
differences between the disciplines of engineering and sociology.  
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Structure • Structure as memory traces in the human mind  
• Action draws on rules of behavior and ability to deploy 
resources and, in so doing, produces and reproduces structure  
• Three dimensions of action/structure: systems of meaning, 
forms of power relations, sets of norms  
• IS embody systems of meaning, provide resources, and 
encapsulate norms, and are thus deeply involved in the 
modalities linking action and structure  
Culture • Conceptualized as shared symbols, norms, and values in a 
social collectivity such as a country  
• Meaning systems, power relations, behavioral norms not 
merely in the mind of one person, but often display enough 
systemness to speak of them being shared  
• But need to recognize intra-cultural variety  
Cross-cultural 
contradiction and 
conflict 
• Conflict is actual struggle between actors and groups  
• Contradiction is potential basis for conflict arising from 
divisions of interest, e.g,, divergent forms of life 
• Conflicts may occur in cross-cultural working if differences 
affect actors negatively and they are able to act 
 Reflexivity and 
change 
• Reproduction through processes of routinization  
• But human beings reflexively monitor actions and 
consequences, creating a basis for social change 
Table 6.1: Structuration Theory, Culture, and ICTs: Some Key Concepts (Walsham 
2002). 
 
Structuration theory is presented by Walsham as particularly applicable to the study 
of cross-cultural working and IS: ‘The crucial point here is that structure … is seen as 
rules of behavior and the ability to deploy resources, which exist in the human mind 
itself, rather than as outside constraints’ (Walsham 2002). Human action and 
‘structure in the mind’ are composed of the inextricably linked dimensions of systems 
of meaning, forms of power relations, and sets of norms, and it is these and their 
reproduction through behaviour which can be examined and made sense of through 
structuration theory. At the end of such an analysis, a deeper understanding of how 
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the information system is situated within a network of actors will emerge, enabling 
the technologist to better fit the system to its social context, or at least provide 
explanations for situations where the implementation fails. Table 6.1 is taken 
verbatim from Walsham and most non-sociologists would find the language requires a 
great deal of explanation, just as a satellite schematic would be incomprehensible to 
most sociologists.  
 
It is worth pointing out that two paradigms characterise much of the research in the 
Information Systems discipline: behavioural science and design science (Hevner et al. 
2004). What is described above with the application of structuration theory looks at 
the behaviour of an implemented IS. Operations Research also generally examines 
behaviour (of the human and non-human components of a system). Design 
frameworks were covered in the earlier chapters. 
6.3 Sociology	  and	  psychology	  applied	  to	  IT	  and	  space	  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, ‘Human Factors Research’ in computing focussed on 
cognitive psychology and in particular those aspects readily reducible to statistics. 
Individual human characteristics were examined from the point of view of sensory 
and required motor skills to improve the human-computer interface (the author has a 
Masters degree in this subject from 1984). This research has improved such 
technologies as computer typefaces and anti-aliasing techniques, and certain aspects 
of the design and operations of peripheral devices, but it focuses on instances of 
human beings and not on collective behaviour, as anthropology does.  
 
Aspects of Operations Research have made their way into Information Systems 
development that regard the digital system as part of a group of processes that include 
human workflows situated in the workplace. The theoretical underpinning of this 
work was weak and implicit, the works of Weber and Durkheim (founders of 
sociology) being long buried under a century of social science research. There are 
however many more commercially oriented frameworks routinely used in the analysis 
and design of information systems, most having arisen in the past 40 years. 
Commonest among these are the Zachmann framework, touched on earlier, and 
Porter’s Value Chain model and their variants, extensively used in business. These 
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frameworks derive from Systems Thinking whose origins are from biology research 
in the early to mid-20th century, and before that, some say, Eastern philosophy (Pan et 
al. 2013). Systems Thinking informed systems engineering which is the basis for the 
systems methodologies behind space mission development.  
 
The history of systems engineering and methodologies in the space industry may have 
their roots in more holistic, human-centred philosophies, but today the software 
developer and engineer will not normally be familiar with them, nor will they have 
the tools and norms in their industry to apply this knowledge. The problem may boil 
down to “modern” education systems which persist in dividing education into arts and 
sciences. 
 
This division is one perpetuated by institutions such as the University of Cape Town 
whose very architecture espouses the vast perceptual gulf between ars et scientia, 
with the Humanities Faculty at one end of the campus, Sciences at the other, and 
Engineering and the Built Environment in-between. At one end of the campus are the 
students sporting ponytails with no make-up or embellishment beyond the purely 
practical. At the other end of the campus is the Faculty of Commerce, where students 
grasp that content is not all, and spend their university years networking and 
improving their social standing, entailing a great deal of grooming and fashion-
consciousness. 
 
There have been attempts in recent years to bring non-engineering subjects to the 
engineer, and arts subjects to medical students, as electives (Bailey, 2015). At the 
University of Cape Town, South Africa, engineering students must complete one 
approved liberal arts elective: 
It is a requirement of the Engineering Council of South Africa (ECSA) that all 
engineering graduates be exposed to complementary studies which, inter alia, 
broaden the student’s perspective in the humanities, social sciences or other 
areas to support an understanding of the world (University of Cape Town 
Faculty Of Engineering & The Built Environment Undergraduate Handbook 
2017). 
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These are the exceptions however, and taking one arts course out of scores of 
engineering courses may not have much effect on a student’s future working life, 
particularly since the new recruit will be initiated informally or formally into 
company practices. Pragmatically, an engineering student must complete a curriculum 
fit for engineering, so to suggest greater liberal arts content at university level may not 
be sensible, although there are some medical schools that insist on doctors spending 
an entire year studying, or working, entirely outside of the medical field. 
 
In many respects we are binary creatures, as if a biological, cerebral division is 
encouraged and taken as physical reality in the world at large: are you left-brained or 
right-brained; male/female; black/white (significant in South Africa); an arts or a 
science graduate? As any social anthropologist will attest, those who, or that which, 
crosses these arbitrary and socially constructed boundaries are taboo by definition 
(Douglas, 1966). Ambiguity is not tolerated, from those of alternative sexual 
persuasion, to those of mixed race in South Africa: ambivalence and boundary-
crossing are discomfiting. People must be male or female, black or white, artists or 
scientists, and not both at the same time. This pervasive fear of liminality and the 
highly contingent notion that education must be ordered into two categories breeds 
the inability to face and solve problems which are both technological and 
sociological.  
 
Centuries of academic discourse on the complex relationship between society and 
technology passes the technologists and engineers by, generation after generation. Of 
course, this phenomenon isn’t limited to engineering and the space community. The 
space industry is not alone in having a distant relationship to users, in only 
considering superficial aspects of use cases, or in working for intermediate entities 
who may not consider the human user important, even though it is the human who 
ultimately spends the money. Evidence for this can be found in many quarters: car-
centred town planning leaves those on foot stranded in distasteful and dangerous 
wasteland areas between roads; aircraft are built in order to compete for carriers, not 
for customers who are sardined into them and deprived of decent air; kitchens are 
designed by architects to look good, not for those who have to maintain hygiene and 
feed a family in them. End users are often treated as problematic, even in the software 
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industry, which has been held up as an example for the space industry to follow in this 
study.  
 
Some would go further, and declare that it is of necessity that institutions and 
organisations contain within them the opposite of what they purport to be and do. 
That a space industry so hell-bent on speed and escape, breaking new ground, the 
ultimate in exploration, should be internally sluggish, reluctant to change and hide-
bound in its orthodoxy, betrays institutional shadow. Hollis (2008), along with many 
other Jungian analysts, demonstrates how it is that society’s institutions as well as 
individuals, contain within them opposing forces, which can become the seeds of their 
own demise. A person’s shadow is that which he or she hides from themselves, often 
the very opposite features to those they display to the world. Institutions similarly act 
out their shadows in false consciousness5, impacting society with actions borne from 
the opposite values to those which they purport to uphold.  Governments outwardly 
intend to serve their people, yet plunder the public purse in pursuit of self-interest 
through corruption, nepotism and greed; schools snuff out a child’s natural curiosity 
about the outside world, as can be witnessed through the building of structures with 
high walls and windows, with punitive pedagogical practices that instil in the child a 
loathing of learning and inuring the child to boredom; hospitals are unhealthy places 
to inhabit especially when sick. The space industry, for all its braggadocio, fears risk 
and change. As Hollis pointed out: 
‘Underneath the civilizing fantasies of any institution lie the archaic issues of 
anxiety management and self-interest. When these two threats are activated, 
institutions, like individuals, tend to regress and abandon their founding 
vision’ (Hollis, 2008). 
 
The reason quoted by space engineers for their risk and change aversion is that at the 
core of space mission design is the need to retire risk, obviously needful when 
expensive rocketry has a high chance of destroying the client’s payload before 
reaching orbit. Technology Readiness Assessments form the basis of procurement 
decisions whose sole purpose is to ensure that whatever components are used have 
                                                
5 A term coined by Marx where the true nature of a political or social situation is 
occluded by displaying opposite characteristics, often perpetrated by symbols.  
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already been used before. By contrast, heritage, in the IT industry, is anathema. Not 
only is it costly and high risk to have to deal with legacy systems, but the IT industry 
needs a high rate of obsolescence in order to progress. Operating systems and 
application software must be upgraded frequently to keep customers coming back for 
more. This is not only because the technology itself is immature (as would be the 
response to Technology Readiness Assessment), but also because it makes sound 
business sense. It would be unthinkable for IT companies to create a product that 
never needs to be tampered with, replaced or refreshed. 
 
Interestingly, in terms of this line of enquiry, a need to honour the pragmatism of 
space heritage does not preclude changing business and development practices. It is 
possible for the Space Mission Analysis and Design (SMAD) process to honour its 
reliance on Technology Readiness Assessment and space heritage, whilst taking novel 
and unfamiliar approaches to user requirements determination. After all, it is only 
likely to be the payload that may change if users are better consulted, not the rocket, 
launch, and ground stations. The mighty tomes of the ECSS manuals, printed and 
bound and on chief engineers’ shelves, are not there by birthright. Inertia and fear of 
change keeps them there, fastened to the wall. As shown in Chapter 4, the IT industry 
doesn’t care for space heritage, and isn’t interested in tried and tested methods: it will 
cherry-pick from current engineering practices and products whatever works for the 
moment. By contrast, the space industry’s sluggishness looks like institutional 
shadow at work. 
 
For all the criticism of space engineering and its reluctance to embrace risk and 
change, it is increasingly the IT or data industry which turns space-derived data into 
products, even when the IT industry has not had the opportunity to specify 
characteristics of that data. The IT industry does not suffer from historical baggage or 
myopia. It can nevertheless be criticised of cultural homogeneity. 
6.4 Where	  does	  this	  leave	  space	  applications	  for	  Africa?	  
As stated in Chapter 2, the hypothesis in this study is that, by relegating the user 
concept and focusing only on client requirements to drive satellite design, the space 
industry is missing large potential new markets for space-derived data, and 
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inadequately specifying payloads. The implication is that large potential new markets 
could be found in Africa if a fresh view of users were taken. 
 
Since there has been a large body of work in the field of ICT4D, which is highly user 
orientated and where there has been plenty of focus on Africa, why hasn’t this 
resulted in applications appropriate to the African continent? We remain in a situation 
where space images exist but are not utilised, and many needs exist which are not 
addressed but could be, by appropriate space missions. This situation persists despite 
decades of research in ICT4D.  
 
The immediate response is poverty, and that space missions and high tech are costly. 
But this doesn’t fully answer the question of why ICT4D has not produced sustainable 
results, particularly given the large size of potential markets. Bill Gates, co-founder of 
Microsoft and co-chair of The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, encapsulates the 
answer:  
‘… there are few one-size-fits-all solutions. If technology is going to improve 
the lives of the world’s poorest, it must be grounded in a deep understanding 
of human behavior and an appreciation for cultural differences’ (Gates, quoted 
in Toyama 2015). 
 
Toyama is a critic of ICT4D, deeming it populated by those with self-serving, often 
technocentric agendas. His polemic book Geek Heresy attacks those who believe that 
answers to problems lie in technology alone. He lists what is really required to change 
the world: 
‘…we should focus on those goals for which technology and technocracy are 
ill suited: serving poor communities, educating the less educated, reforming 
dysfunctional institutions, organizing marginalized groups, preparing for long-
term crises, encouraging self-transcendence, and eliciting responsiveness from 
those in power’ (Toyama 2015). 
 
These all require long-term relationships, not the quick fix of a project that fits into an 
academic calendar in an institution far away from the communities it researches but 
does not serve. 
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If ICT4D has not produced satellite-based solutions to social problems, and African 
space agencies and governments are too poor for the investments required to create 
the space technologies required for the continent, commercial interest and disruptive 
innovations may provide a way forward. As mentioned in Chapter 4, many of the new 
disruptors of the space engineering world are situated in Silicon Valley, California, 
and are no different to the IT start-ups that fuelled the dotcom boom. Making 
financial profits is not the only motivation for high-technology start-ups. As described 
in the BBC documentary ‘Secrets of Silicon Valley’, Episode 1: The Disruptors 
(2017), there is an element of building a better world to many of the activities of 
disruptors. For all the justified cynicism of commentators such as Toyama, many 
technologists are keen to have their innovations used for public good. 
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7 Concluding remarks and recommendations 
The problem explored in this study is that the space industry develops products that 
are not what end users want or need, and in this manner distracts itself from 
developing products that might be useful to more people. The chief reason identified 
for this problem is that there is usually a large gap between end users and those who 
design space missions and satellites. The answer then appears that this gap should be 
narrowed. However, the structure of the space industry means that it is difficult to 
narrow this gap. The space industry creates space technology and artefacts for others 
to utilise, in particular the IT industry. It is the IT industry that develops applications 
for the end user that can take advantage of the technologies offered by space. 
 
There are secondary problems that make it difficult for the space industry to address 
this gap, and these are further reasons offered by the space industry itself for the 
problem described above: 
• The need for low-risk technical approaches 
• The time it takes to create an artefact that will be launched into space 
• The overall cost of development, deployment and operations 
• The need to settle on a particular technical configuration and componentry 
relatively early on in the design process 
 
The gap between end user and space technology developer is unlikely to narrow 
unless applications developers become the clients, or themselves become space 
developers. As we have shown, this is happening with disruptive innovation, where 
many space start-ups are located in Silicon Valley and have arisen from an IT 
background, and act more like IT organisations than space engineering companies. As 
the space industry commercialises and is put under more pressure from disruptors, it 
will adapt: shorten design cycles, re-examine its methods, and shake off its cultural 
inertia.  
 
We have also critiqued the development methods employed by the space industry in 
how they approach users, and compared the space industry with the IT industry in 
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how it treats users. In particular we examined the design methodologies and 
architectures employed in the IT industry quite closely to see what can be learnt about 
different approaches, and whether there is anything useful that the space industry, at 
least satellite developers, could learn from the IT industry. However it was difficult to 
conclude that the more agile and cyclical development methods of the IT industry 
could be applied to space, where the chief mode is of a mission with essentially one 
end product, rather than a continuous development exercise. 
 
Governments, who are often the clients specifying space technologies, have no 
feedback loop that shows whether money has been wasted in the past, and may again 
be wasted. This may never come to pass, since what constitutes wasteful expenditure 
in a political context is highly contingent on the moment, and that feedback loop, 
when it involves end-to-end design, deployment and user reactions, takes several 
years and perhaps longer than a usual political term of office. In addition, the subject 
is fairly esoteric and unlikely to provoke public response, and governments rarely 
change tack unless driven by the public or some major external force. A government 
can always justify the claim that it has discharged its responsibility by providing 
funding for what can always be couched as human capital development, industrial 
stimulation, or in the case of parastatal space industries, job creation. 
 
The driver for change, and for better user-responsive space, is commercialisation. 
This also breeds a broadening of the space industry to incorporate, or be ousted by, 
the IT and data industries, who are now encroaching into space territory. These 
industries are not affected by traditions and ways of thinking and working that 
preclude change. This may result in technical debt, as covered in Chapter 4, but some 
alternative organisations will prevail to become the dominant forces. There is no 
recommendation here beyond watching as business dynamics play out.  
 
Engineers and developers are in a position to be more connected to the user and to 
take a wider view of what constitutes user requirements and how these devolve into 
technology offerings. Unfortunately they are not trained in thinking beyond the 
technocentric and have a primary imperative to satisfy the client. This client also 
employs engineers as specifiers, and they themselves have other clients, often 
government, and the individuals in the long value chain are likely to be all engineers 
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or technologists.  These highly trained technical people have necessarily received a 
blinkered education and are unaware, in a very fundamental way, of the world outside 
their offices and the opportunities it affords.  
 
The reason for Africa and other developing countries being poorly served by satellite 
technologies is not only because they are poor and cannot afford them. The majority 
of people on Earth live in developing countries, and now that we have the means to 
carry out microfinance and microtransactions, there are fewer monetary obstacles to 
delivering services to the poor. However, the technologists, developers and specifiers 
of space systems do not understand the lives of the poor. Nor are the clients and 
intermediaries able to create business models for situations with which they are not 
familiar. Africa represents the second-largest land mass on the planet with the second 
largest population, and as such ought to be well-serviced by satellite imagery and 
other data and space-derived services, but the opposite is true.  
 
As an industry, space is far from adding cultural heterogeneity into its business 
models. In terms of Africa and what to do about the dearth of space activity and 
provision, there is only one recommendation. Changing the political modi operandi of 
African national governments is not going to happen with alacrity. Neither will the 
engineering curricula of universities become sufficiently broad for engineers to 
incorporate sociological approaches to design (if this is indeed desirable). We need 
more diversity in the space industry: more women, more people from different 
cultural backgrounds, and most importantly we need to honour their differences.  
 
Any social grouping, deliberately or unconsciously, impacts individuals, forcing or 
encouraging them to conform and reproduce group norms, values and behaviours. 
Perhaps something can be harvested from the non-conformists before they become 
acculturated into the space engineering world, and turn up for work in checked shirts 
and chinos, a fleece when it’s cold: a uniform of navy blue, beige, and occasionally 
bottle green. Perhaps their viewpoints and suggestions can be taken seriously, and 
then perhaps the woman with a hoe in her gomesi will be seen as a consumer of space 
services and not as somebody else’s problem. This could be the goal of social and 
political transformation: not merely to ensure that previously disadvantaged 
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individuals gain career purchase in areas once precluded from us, but that our 
differences are celebrated and alternative knowledge harvested. To capture the 
‘knowledge features’ of people who are not typical space engineers is the task. As the 
UN’s World Social Science Report states:  
‘Inequalities are multi-dimensional, multi-layered and cumulative. The Report 
makes clear that understanding and acting effectively upon inequalities 
requires looking beyond income and wealth disparities to capture their 
political, environmental, social, cultural, spatial, and knowledge features. 
Untangling such complexity is a challenge we must fully take on – if we are to 
develop policies and solutions that are feasible and sustainable’ (UNESCO 
and ISSC 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Indian Space Research Organisation engineers celebrate the 
launch of the Mars Orbiter spacecraft. Credit: AFP News Agency. 
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